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While liberalisation is designed to help growth and alleviate poverty by removing impediments 
that  stop  people  and  regions  from  specialising  and  trading,  the  process  known  as  Core 
liberalisation (CL) has three components: it frees markets in goods and services, land, capital, 
and labour; phases out non-market influences on prices; and clarifies property rights. In the 
case  of  China,  CL  accompanied  rapid,  robust  economic  growth  and  reduction  in  poverty. 
However, from the mid-1980s, inequality – among regions, between city and village, and within 
rural  communities  –  soared,  leaving  stubborn  poverty  increasingly  concentrated  in  ‘rural 
poverty islands’ (RPIs). By 2001, almost 40 per cent of China’s poor – but only about a fifth of 
the population – lived in these RPIs.  This paper analyses evidence of liberalisation in China, 
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Chapter 1. Liberalisations: processes, growth, structural change and poverty 
 
This chapter reviews the Chinese economic reforms and their effects on growth, inequality and 
hence rural poverty. China launched its comprehensive economic reforms in the late 1970s, and 
they are still in process. Their primary objective is to transform China from a centrally directed 
economy into a market-oriented economy. In contrast to the ‘big bang’ reform strategy practised 
in some FSU and East European countries in the 1990s, the speed of reforms in China has 
varied since 1978, with three overlapping waves of liberalisation-led reforms: of agriculture, 
non-farm activity, and international economic relations. 
 
These liberalisations freed  up  markets  in  goods  and  services, investment,  and  (though  to  a 
smaller extent) land and labour; phased out non-market influences on prices for competitive 
commodities; and (to some degree) clarified property rights. These three goals comprise the 
‘core-meaning’ of liberalisation, and may be called ‘comparative-advantage-following’ (CAF). 
When  able  to  decide  and  move  more  freely,  persons,  enterprises,  products  and  factors  are 
likelier to select activities in line with China’s comparative advantages. Where infrastructure, 
public goods, and merit goods such as health and education are supplied reasonably adequately, 
CAF liberalisation will help to realise robust economic growth.  
 
However, some advocacy of liberalisation extends far beyond the core, suggesting that the State 
withdraw  from  –  or  at least finance  by  user  charges  instead  of  taxation – most  aspects  of 
production, provision or regulation. Some of this ‘beyond-core’ activity – where it seeks to 
phase out subsidised or non-competitive state production of private goods, public-sector rent-
seeking,  and  merely  restrictive  regulations  –  supports,  and  may  be  essential  for,  core 
liberalisation  to  stimulate  competitive,  CAF  provision.  However,  private-sector  response  to 
CAF  core  liberalisation  is  weakened  by  other  forms  of  beyond-core  liberalisation:  State 
withdrawal from, or full charging for, public, merit, and some infrastructural goods; State non-
regulation of financial and other markets whose transparent operation is required for efficient 
business; and State refusal to pre-announce and implement strategies. These strategies may 
include (but are not confined to) taxes or rules to reduce negative environmental and other 
externalities, to prioritise poorer or otherwise disadvantaged groups, and to ensure adequate 
human development, even if such taxes or rules sometimes run against profit-seeking activities 
by companies. 
 
There  is  are  tense  debates  between  those  who  emphasise  market  freedom  in  core  CAF 
liberalisation, and those who emphasise the need to finance and implement purposive state 
action to underpin, regulate, and spread the gains from, market-led development. Both market 
operators  and  State  officials  have  self-interest  in  the  outcome  of  these  debates.  Therefore, 
decisions on the changing borders of State action should be reached with maximum openness, 
popular  understanding  and  involvement,  and  where  appropriate  decentralisation.  Although 
much of the reduction of size of China’s huge State sector during 1977-90 was probably needed 
to permit core liberalisation, the good market response to it required much continuing State 
action in China (e.g. public irrigation and agricultural research). And some phasing-out of State 
action (e.g. free basic health and education) has cut market responsiveness to core liberalisation. 
 
(a) Wave 1: Agricultural Liberalisation 
 
China’s  economic  reforms  started  in  agriculture,  with  the  introduction  of  the  Household 
Responsibility  System  (HRS)  to  replace  the  commune  system.  Though  land  ownership 
remained public, use rights to commune land were allocated among rural households, with each 
responsible for farming an area (adjusted for quality) proportional to its population. HRS spread 
across provinces at different speeds, but by 1984 all provinces had adopted it. 
   3 
In addition to property rights reform, government in 1977-84 increased the procurement prices 
(i.e.  reduced  negative  effective  protection)  of  agricultural  commodities,  and  decreased  the 
amount of procurement in total agricultural production.
1 The liberalising trends continued after 
1984. By the late 1990s, the domestic markets of all agricultural commodities except grain had 
been liberalised. As a result, the numbers of rural markets has increased, and more agricultural 
commodities have been traded through free market rather than state-owned distribution channels 
(Figure 1a-b). After 1992 foreign trade restrictions were relaxed.
2 In factor markets there were 
experiments in longer land leases
3 to households, legalisation of rentals by households,
4 and 
even company farming. 
 
All  these  measures  increased  the  farmers’  range  of  choice,  which  improved  agricultural 
productivity. HRS explains most of the astonishing 6 percent per year rise in agricultural value-
added per hectare in 1977-85 (McMillan et. al. 1989; Fan 1991; Lin 1992), and other aspects of 
liberalisation  probably  explain  the  remainder.
5 Such  growth,  together  with  the  very  equal 
distribution of post-HRS farmland, caused rural poverty incidence to fall sharply, by at least 
two-thirds, from 1978 to 1984 (table 4). Rural-urban and regional inequality rose very modestly 
in this period, and intra-rural inequality hardly at all.
6  
 
(b) Wave 2: Liberalising rural enterprises (REs)
7 and urban non-state sectors (UNSSs) 
 
Encouraged  by  the  success  of  agricultural  reforms,  Chinese  leaders  began  to  permit  and 
encourage REs, and to implement market-oriented reforms in the urban areas. From 1982, initial 
priority was given to reforming State-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, to meet the market 
demands for consumption goods at the outset of the economic reform – and to impose market 
pressures on SOEs – REs and UNSSs, mostly in light industry or services, were also allowed.
8  
 
After 1992 the government adopted the strategy of ‘protecting the large, releasing the small’ 
(zhuada fangxiao).
9 In concert with SOE reforms, other major institutional reforms proceeded: 
fiscal, social-security, and financial (especially banking) reforms, many of them still in process. 
How is the ‘second wave’ of liberalisations affecting growth, distribution and the rural poor?  
 
                                                 
1In 1979, government procurement at below-market prices accounted for about 21% of total grain production. In 
2003, the procurement prices are higher than market prices, while the procurement volume is less than 13% of total 
grain production. 
2 Prior to China’s WTO accession, the average agricultural tariff rate dropped from 0.42 in 1992 to 0.21 in 2001. 
Between 2002 and 2004, the average tariff rate further dropped from 0.21 to 0.17. 
3This implied less frequent, or no, land reallocations among households by village authorities to allow for changing 
populations. 
4From data for three of China’s poorest provinces, ‘both land rental markets and administrative reallocation transfer 
land to those with lower endowments but (markets do) so more and have a bigger productivity-enhancing effect’ 
(Deininger and Jin 2004). 
5However Rozelle (2004) estimates the contributions at fifty-fifty. Relaxation of quotas helped farmers to respond to 
growing demand for non-grain products as incomes rose. In 1978-84 grain output rose at 4.7% per year, but fruit 
output at 7.2%, and oilseeds, livestock and aquatic products at 14.9%, 9.1% and 7.9% respectively. Though growth of 
agriculture then slowed, it was triple the rate of population growth during the entire reform period (Table 1). 
6(a) Later work by Ravallion and Chen (2004) suggests an even sharper fall, from higher initial incidence, of rural 
poverty. (Table 4). (b) The intra-rural income Gini in 1980 was 0.241 in 1980 and 0.244 in 1984 (MOA 2001).  
7Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were renamed REs in the late 1990s, when reformed as shareholding or 
other private. 
8To align official ideology with the development of the non-state economy, the Communist Party (CP) amended the 
constitution in 1982, 1984 and 1999 to allow private sectors to develop in a socialist system. In 2002 they adopted a 
new formulation that allowed private businessmen to join the CP. In Marsh 2004 the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) approved the amendments to the constitution. The new constitution adds some articles on private property 
protection and human rights protection. 
9The state continues to pump resources into several hundred elite SOEs in the hope that they will be turned into 
‘flagship’ conglomerates and multinationals (jituan gongsi). Smaller SOEs are asked to ‘find their own solution’. 
Financing of SOEs reform would be split three ways (write-off, redefinition, stock issues).   4 
First, the reforms substantially shift resources – and demand – from the state-owned economy 
to the non-state sectors. This, together with rural sourcing by many UNSSs, means that UNSS 
growth has not driven out smaller, more labour-intensive REs: in 1985-2002, provinces with 
larger UNSS shares in industrial output had larger RE shares too (Figure 2).  
 
Second, due to these liberalisations, UNSSs and REs developed very quickly. Net added-value 
of REs rose from 10 percent of China’s GDP in 1985 to 31 percent in 2002 (Statistics Yearbook 
for TVEs 2003). Second, due to these liberalisations, UNSSs and REs developed very quickly. 
Added-value  of  REs  rose  from  10  percent  of  Chinas  GDP  in  1985  to  31  percent  in  2002 
(Statistics, 2003). The UNSSs’ share almost certainly also rose, though the data are not clear.
10  
 
Third,  apart  from  accelerating  GDP,  the  fast  growth  of  UNSSs  and  REs  (and  the  shift  of 
resources to them from SOEs) raised the share of wages in income. Compared with SOEs, 
UNSSs and REs are relatively competitive. Hence their technical choices tend to be labour-
intensive, following China’s comparative advantage. That bids up wage-rates and employment. 
 
Fourth, and offsetting these gains for equality and distribution, the growing shares of UNSSs – 
and even of REs – raised demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled, towns and coastal or 
well-integrated places relative to remote rural areas, and industry relative to agriculture. Hence 
the  impact  of  the  second  wave  of  liberalisation  on  regional,  intra-rural  and  rural-urban 
inequality was much less favourable as the impact of the previous, agricultural wave, and may 
well have been negative. REs, initially favouring poorer parts of China, from the late 1980s 
became increasingly concentrated in the better-off areas (Howes and Hussain 1994). Due to the 
growth and efficiency benefits of liberalised REs and UNSSs, the net impact on rural poverty – 
also via cheaper consumer goods – was surely positive, but the immobile poor in remote regions 
may have gained very little, or even lost due to competition.  
 
(c)  Wave 3: Trade Liberalisation and Opening to FDI 
 
Already in the early 1980s, China began to reform its foreign trade management system to suit 
the needs of overall reform strategy. The reform included giving more self-management power 
to enterprises to pursue foreign business; gradually revoking mandatory planning; permitting 
foreign-trading enterprises to keep some foreign exchange; and setting up special economic 
zones in coastal provinces. From the mid-1980s, more autonomy was given to foreign-trading 
enterprises, and more UNSSs and REs were permitted to engage in foreign trade. Meanwhile, 
on average the tariff rate has been in a declining trend. The average tariff rate at the end of 1992 
was 0.43, which was reduced to 0.35 in 1992, 0.17 in 1997 and 0.15 in 2000. In 2001, China 
joined WTO, signalling renewed trade liberalisation.  
 
Overall, foreign trade grew at almost 15 percent per year in the reform years 1979-95. However, 
it had expanded faster, at 20 percent per year, in the pre-reform period 1970-79 – i.e. at a 
multiple of 4.2 times the rate of economic growth. That multiple fell steadily, reaching 1.2 in 
the period 1996-2000 affected by the Asian crisis, and 1.0 in 2001, when trade and GDP grew at 
the same rate, 7.5 percent. Thereafter, the growth rate of foreign trade soared, reaching 35 
percent in 2003 (Table 1). How did liberalisation affect these trade trends? 
 
Internal liberalisation, as such, probably stimulated diversion from exports and imports to the 
freed-up domestic sectors. Trade growth, for a while, was not quite so much faster than GDP 
growth  –  but  still  fast.  In  1980-2001,  China’s  primary  goods  trade  (mainly  agriculture) 
increased from US$16.1 billion to US$72.1 billion, an annual growth of 7.4 percent. When 
China joined WTO in November 2001, historically high trade growth was unleashed. Overall, 
                                                 
10The definition of SOEs changed in 1996. Before and after then, many data for UNSSs and SOEs count gross output 
of each enterprise (instead of value added). This leads to an unknown amount of double counting, changing with the 
degree of vertical integration in the SOE and UNSS sectors.   5 
China’s trade to GDP ratio increased from less than 13 percent in 1980 to over 50 percent in 
2003. Growth of foreign trade is likely to remain high in the coming years. 
 
China has also integrated into the world economy through increasing openness to foreign capital 
inflows, especially FDI, which accounts for more than 70 percent of them. After the mid-1980s, 
in order to build up production capacity and absorb advanced technologies, China speeded up 
the liberalisation of FDI, making it easier for foreign-owned or Sino-foreign venture enterprises 
to  run  manufacturing  factories,  especially  export-oriented  enterprises.
11 Between  1979  and 
1984, the total gross inflow of FDI was only $3.06 billion; in 2002 alone it was $52.7 billion. At 
present, most FDI comes from advanced countries, and concentrates in coastal provinces and 
manufacturing sectors; the poor’s occupations (mainly agriculture) and home areas (mainly in 
the West-Central poverty crescent – see p. 16) obtain shares of FDI far below their shares in 
population.
12 FDI  has  nevertheless  reduced  poverty  by  being  export-oriented,  and  therefore 
following China’s comparative advantage by being labour-intensive. That bids up the demand 
for labour, the poor’s main resource. More than half of China’s exports, most of them labour-
intensive, are produced by multinational corporations (UNCTAD 2003).
13 
 
(d) Three waves of liberalisation: effects on growth and poverty 
 
Unless the process is very seriously unequalising, growth as fast as China’s is likely to bring 
rapid poverty reduction. That indeed happened (Table 4), but regional and probably rural-urban 
inequality rose sharply, and some rural regions were left far behind.
14  
 
(i) Growth performance: Between 1978 and 2003 (Figure 3) China’s recorded annual growth of 
GDP was 9.2 percent (8 percent per person). GDP grew ninefold and per capita GDP sevenfold. 
Though there is some argument about the GDP data, and rural private income growth was only 
half as fast (ch. 4, sec. (d) (i); fns. 67, 75), economic growth was certainly fast. But the effects 
on poverty and inequality, rural-urban and regional, depend on associated structural changes in 
the economy. These too were substantial. 
 
(ii) Sectoral structural changes and urbanisation: Table 1 shows that in the pre-reform period 
1970-78, agricultural GDP grew at 55 percent of the pace of total GDP. During the first wave of 
liberalisation,  in  agriculture,  this  rose  to  83  percent.  From  1985  to  2001,  with  non-farm 
liberalisation and rapid growth, the ratio fell to 41 percent. With the third, overseas wave of 
liberalisation it fell further: by 2003 GDP was growing almost four times as fast as agricultural 
GDP. Hence the share of agricultural in total GDP fell from 28 percent in 1978 to 14 percent in 
2003, and the employment share of agriculture fell from 70 percent to 49 percent (Table 2).  
 
With such a sharp shift in the structure of employment, China underwent a sharply accelerating 
transition from a rural-based society to an urban-based one. On consistent definitions, the urban 
proportion of China’s population rose from 26.4 percent in 1990 to 37.7 percent in 2001 and 
probably 41 percent in 2004, projected to reach 55 percent by 2005. In 1990-2000, net rural to 
urban migration was 125.5 million, as against 134.4 million in the forty years 1950-90.
15  
 
                                                 
11 Most FDI during 1980s was from overseas Chinese culture zones, especially from Hongkong, China. Until 2001, 
FDI from Hongkong and Taiwan, China still accounted for nearly half the total de facto utilized FDI (Cai and Lin 
2003: Chapter 7).  
12During the 9
th National Plan (1996-2000), Eastern regions received 85.6% of total FDI (for 41.3% of population), 
while Central and Western regions received 9.5% (for 35.6%) and 4.9% (for 23.1%). In 2001, 65.9% of total FDI 
went to manufacturing sectors.  
13In most developing countries FDI is less employment-generating (more capital-intensive) than domestic investment. 
In  China,  both  SOEs  and  domestic  joint-stock  enterprises  had  higher  capital/labour  ratios  than  foreign-owned 
enterprises, though other Chinese enterprises had lower ratios (Cai and Lin 2003).  
14These were generally the most remote, poorest, initially low-wage regions. So why didn’t CAF liberalisation benefit 
them most, instead of (as was the case) least? We address this paradox, and possible remedies, later. 
15See Figure 4; Huang and Rozelle 2005; Chan and Hu 2003.     6 
Big structural changes have also occurred within agriculture (Tables 1, 3; Figure 5). Rising 
incomes,  urbanisation,  and  food  market  development  have  shifted  demand  from  grains  to 
higher-value  products.  However,  more  grains  are  needed  top  feed  people  from  the  most 
important such product – livestock – than from grains directly.
16 Meanwhile liberalisation has 
induced supply shifts from land-intensive to labour-intensive farm products, reflecting China’s 
comparative advantage. Hence, since 1984, the share of grains in agricultural production has 
fallen, replaced in part by faster-growing high-value commodities such as horticulture, livestock 
and fisheries; yet, to meet feedgrain demands, China has depleted grain stocks and raised net 
grain imports. Net exports of land-intensive bulk commodities, such as grains, oilseeds and 
sugar crops, have fallen; exports of higher- valued, more labour-intensive products, such as 
horticultural and animal (including aquaculture) products, have risen. 
 
These structural changes in agriculture, by raising employment per hectare, in general help to 
reduce poverty and inequality. However, two possible exceptions create policy problems. First, 
the  poorer,  unirrigated  West-Central  provinces  tend  to  produce  land-intensive,  low-value 
products, so that liberalisation – with its thrust towards comparative advantage – works against 
the sort of farm production concentrated in these poorer regions, unless their rural poor can shift 
location or product. Second, growing shortages of farm water (and liberalisation itself) render 
increasingly  uneconomic  the  current  intensive  grain  production  based  on  subsidised,  and 
depleting, irrigation water – as in many advanced areas in the eastern Yangtse and Yellow River 
basins.  Solving  the  second  problem,  through  enabling  and  incentive  strategies  to  relocate 
intensive grain production from the irrigated East to the poorer West, can help solve the first 
too. But this will require new agricultural research and infrastructure. As so often, good poverty 
and income-distribution impacts  from  liberalisation  depend  on  expanded,  not  reduced,  state 
provision for public, merit and infrastructural goods. 
 
(iii) Migration and off-farm employment: Growth and structural transformation have permitted 
rural people to increase and diversify incomes, either by migration, or by staying at home and 
raising the proportion of non-farm activity (see chapter 4 for policy implications).
17 By 2000, 
over 40 percent of the workforce registered as rural – some 200 million workers, up 50 million 
since 1995 alone – had non-farm work as their main single source of income. About 100 million 
of these non-farm earners lived in their home villages; the other 100 million were migrants, 
about 85 million of them resident in cities or suburban ‘villages’ within major metropolitan 
areas.
18 The  rapid  expansion  of  REs  and  UNSSs,  being  more  labour-intensive  than  SOEs, 
contributed greatly to rural non-farm income growth (Huang, Rozelle and Zhang 2004). Hence, 
for the average rural household, non-agricultural income exceeded agricultural income in 2000 
for the first time, accounting for just over 50 percent of total income  (Figure 6a). However, 
poorer people and provinces achieve lower proportions of non-farm income (Table 5). Also in 
the National Designated Poverty Counties (Guoding Pinkunxian, NDPCs) in 2003, the ratio of 
off-farm  workers  (including  non-resident  migrants)  to  total  labourers  is  smaller  in  poorer 
households. This is consistent with Chinese and global evidence (ch. 4, sec. (i); Du et al. 2005; 
Connell et al. 1976) that the poorest have much more difficulty in mobilising the resources 
(cash, information, education, social networks) that ease the path to successful migration. 
 
(iv) Poverty reduction: From 1978 to 2003, rural poverty fell from 250 million (31 percent) to 
29 million (under 3 percent) below the national poverty line. Corrections to the rural deflator, 
available only up to 2001, however raise rural poverty in that year 2.6-fold (from 4.75 percent to 
12.49 percent: Table 4). The national poverty line is harsh; but even at the somewhat less harsh 
international line ($1/day, standardised 1993 purchasing power) poverty fell China-wide from 
                                                 
16A given human calorie intake requires 2-7 times more grain from meat and dairy products (for feed) than if the 
humans eat the grain directly.   
17Nearby activity, even if it raises income a lot less, is usually preferred to long-range urbanisation (chapter 4).  
18These were still registered as rural, i.e. were without urban rights under hukou.   7 
62 percent in 1980 to 16.6 percent in 2001 (UNDP 2004:147) and, on a somewhat different 
basis, to 8 percent in 2003 (NBSC 2004: Table 4).  
 
Apart from income-poverty, its non-income correlates have also been reduced. For example, in 
the rural labour force, illiteracy fell from 21 percent in 1990 to 7.4 percent in 2003, while the 
proportion that received junior secondary education or above education rose from 40 percent to 
63 percent (Figure 7). Health care in rural areas, according to survey respondents, had reached a 
high level; according to household survey on National Designated Poverty Counties (NDPCs), 
nearly 84 percent of households reported that ill members would get timely medical treatment. 
 
(v)  The  remaining  poor:  characteristics:  Despite  the  consensus  on  China’s  massive  rural 
poverty reduction, poverty is still far from eliminated. Firstly, there are still nearly 30 million 
rural people living below the nation’s poverty line, and 75 million below the less severe dollar-
a-day poverty line (table 4). 
 
Secondly, there were several setbacks for China’s poor. Rural poverty reduction stalled in the 
late 1980s and early1990s, recovered pace the mid-1990s, but showed signs of stagnating again 
in the late 1990s (table 4). About half of the decline in poverty came in the first few years of the 
1980s. Poverty reduction does not automatically get easier as growth releases more resources 
for it. As poverty incidence rate falls to a certain level, it becomes more difficult to help the 
remaining poor to escape the trap of poverty. 
 
Thirdly, not only has the pace of reduction of rural poverty slowed from the late 1990s, but also 
progress across provinces is uneven (Fig. 8). While rural poverty incidence at the corrected 
official poverty line was 12.5 percent in 2001, it was around or over 20 percent (Table 11) in 
Yunnan, Xingjiang, Qinghai, Gansu and Tibet. The poorest concentrate in the remote, resource-
deficient regions. They comprise almost entire communities, mostly in upland areas of interior 
provinces of SW, NW and North-Central China. People in such areas have lower literacy rates 
and education, often impeding successful migration, and inducing higher population growth. All 
this partly explains why poverty alleviation will become harder in future.  
 
Using 1999 data (NBSC 2003), we divide all sample farmers into eleven income-groups for 
each of three regions: Western, Central and Eastern.
19 Group 1 is below the national poverty 
line;  group  2  is  between  the  national  and  dollar-a-day  poverty  lines.  Table  5  shows  rural 
household characteristics by income groups for each region. Table 6 presents the variations of 
rural household income, and of the sources of income and expenditure, for the poor and other 
rural  groups  in  each  region.  Although  the  results  are  consistent  with  our  expectation,  the 
variations  among  income  groups,  in  particular  between  the  poorest  and  the  richest,  are 
surprisingly large. The poor in each region have a much lower ratio of labour to family size than 
the well-off, e.g., for the poorest (income group 1) in the western region, 1.85 in 1999, well 
above the average for the region (1.60) or for the richest farmers (1.43: table 5). This indicates 
high mortality, and higher replacement fertility, among the very poor. In international studies 
this is often a cause as well as an effect of poverty. Better health and female education would 
help poor people in poor regions to cut fertility, dependency ratios, and thus poverty (chapters 
3-4). 
 
The poor lag even further behind in human capital and access to off-farm employment. For 
example, in 1999 annual average per capita income of the poorest (group 1) in the western 
region was 356 yuan (more than 40 percent below the national absolute poverty line of 625 
yuan). Nearly 30 percent of the poorest were illiterate, about thrice the proportion in the richest 
                                                 
19Western region includes Sha'anxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Chongqing,  Tibet and 
Xingjiang.  Central region include Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan and 
Hubei; and Eastern region includes Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Hainan, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai.    8 
group (group 11 in Table 5). In the western region, even poor farmers who received education 
dropped out earlier. Two-thirds of the poorest quintile got no further than primary school (row 
6).   
 
The lower human capital also seems to have had an impact on the access of the poor in different 
regions to off-farm employment (de Brauw et al., 2002). For example, the poorest (group 1) in 
the western region spent only 3.7 percent of their time on off-farm activities (table 5, row 4). 
Ravallion  and  Jalan  (1997)  show  how  ‘spatial  poverty  traps’  –  due  to  lack  of  ‘geographic 
capital’ in a province – reinforce unfortunate household characteristics to perpetuate poverty in 
some of these households. Indeed, the same (poorest) income-group in the east spent more than 
17 percent of their time on off-farm activities; and individuals in the east in the richest group in 
the west (group 11), 38 percent of their time. 
 
Income disparities within each region are substantial. Income for the richest (group 11) is about 
8 times higher than for the bottom 10 percent in the western region (groups 1 and 2): 11 times 
greater than for group 1 and 6.7 times than for group 2 (Table 6, row 1). Similar patterns are 
found within the other regions. Poor and rich groups differ in income sources, explaining some 
of this inequality. Wages contribute more than other income sources to inter-group variation in 
income-per-person. Poor groups earn a much lower proportion of income from wages and other 
off-farm activities; their greater reliance on agriculture, relative to other income groups, helps 
keep them poorer. If their wage share were as high as in other groups, within-region inequality 
would be much lower. Table 6 also shows that income depends more on agriculture in poorer 
households. The share of agricultural income in total income ranged from 70 to 76 percent in 
the poorest group 1 in all regions; in contrast, the share was only 25 percent in group 11. A 25 
percent rise in every household’s agricultural income would substantially increase the income of 
the poor relative to the rich; but so would a rise in the proportion of the poor’s working time that 
was spent on obtaining income from non-farm, especially wage, sources.    
 
Both total expenditures and food expenditure are closely associated with income levels. As in 
India, the poor spent more than their earnings in 1999 (Table 6). This means that they were 
either receiving transfers from the government, their relatives or friends or were borrowing; in 
either case, they were not able to save. Rural people with income per person below 625 yuan 
spent about 60 to 70 percent of their total expenditure on food. In contrast, rural people with 
over 2500 yuan per person spent less than half of their total expenditures on food, and had 
positive savings.  
 
We begin to see the policy problem. The remaining poor are seldom able to save; are mostly 
trapped in remote rural areas with little ‘geographic capital’ for agricultural progress; yet are 
little-educated and hence with limited capacity to earn off the farm (or, as we shall see, to 
migrate to the city). They also have high ratios of dependants to workers. It is harder for these 
people to escape poverty by seizing opportunities due to liberalisation than was the case for 
their predecessors, who escaped poverty in 1975-2005; indeed, some aspects of liberalisation 
(land- intensive farm imports, for example, and the attraction of investments towards coastal 
areas)  may  threaten  the  residual  poor  with  even  deeper  poverty.  Nevertheless,  these  very 
characteristics  of  the  hard  core  poor  –  regionality,  focus  on  certain  neglected  styles  of 
agriculture, low human capital, high fertility and mortality – give strong hints of what policies 
need to do to help. Liberalisation will need to be seasoned with purposive state action. We 
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Chapter 2. Rising Inequality and Disparity 
 
 
(a)  Overall, rural, urban, and rural-urban inequality 
 
Alongside China’s stunning growth rate, inequality of income-per-head has risen sharply – as 
often happens, though not always, in countries in transition to a market economy (Cornia et al. 
2004). China’s Gini index, on official survey data, rose from 30.9 in 1981 to 44.7 in 2001 
(Figure 9a).
20 In 1981-5, of six large comparator countries in Asia, China was the most equal in 
1981-5, but the most unequal in 1999-2001.
21  
 
Overall inequality comprises rural, urban, and rural-urban inequality. In China, unusually, the 
rural income-per-head Gini exceeds the urban. In view of the equal intra-village distribution of 
farmland, this must be due to regional disparities, plus the fast rise in the non-farm (and more 
unequal) component of rural income; indeed, the rural Gini has risen faster than the urban Gini 
(Figure 9a). As for urban-rural income inequality, though it fell in the early 1980s and the mid-
1990s, in most of the reform period it has been on a rising trend (see chapter 3, sec. (a) (i)).
22  
 
(b) Asset inequality 
 
Despite the very equalising land redistribution of 1977-84, in both urban and rural areas the 
poorest  later  suffered  sharp  falls  in  their  share  of  assets.  In  1995-2002  the  asset  share  of 
households containing the poorest decile of persons fell from 0.7 to 0.2 percent in urban areas, 
and from 3.1 to 2.0 percent in rural areas (Table 7). Rural asset inequality increased overall, 
with the top three deciles gaining share and the bottom seven deciles all losing. Urban changes 
were less clear: asset shares in 1995-2002 fell for the lowest and the highest decile; all other 
deciles gained asset share at their expense (Li, Wei and Ding 2005). 
 
Table 8 suggests an explosion in rural-urban wealth inequality in 1995-2002. Net of liabilities, 
the real value of assets per urban person rose 3.4-fold (i.e. by 18.9 percent a year), but per rural 
person only 1.1-fold (by 1.8 percent per year). Thus the urban-rural ratio rose from 1.2 in 1995 
to 3.6 in 2002. Some of this may be an urban  ‘bubble’ – Table 8 shows that urban house values 
quintupled and financial assets tripled – but much of the rise in urban-rural asset inequality was 
almost certainly genuine. 
 
Summarising these two sections: within-rural inequality has risen substantially for assets and 
income; rural-urban inequality has risen explosively for assets, and probably substantially for 
income. So, during China’s rapid growth and reforms, poorer rural people, and as we shall see 
areas, have fallen even further behind both the rural better-off and the urban average. 
 
(c) Regional income inequality 
 
Especially  in  populous,  large  and  geographically  diverse  developing  countries,  regional 
development is commonly uneven. However, in most such countries – say India or Indonesia – 
it is far from clear whether development brings regional ‘divergence’ or ‘convergence’. China 
                                                 
20Ravallion and Chen (2004) show that official data overstate the rise in rural living-cost relative to urban, and so the 
extent to which urban real income pulled ahead. Adjusting for this (table 4) they find a rather less steep rise in the 
national Gini (28.0- 39.4). 
21China’s Gini showed no trend in 1981-5 or 1999-2001. Ginis around 1998-2001: Bangladesh 31.8, India 32.5, 
Indonesia  34.3,  Pakistan  33.0,  Vietnam  36.1.  Others  of  interest:  Brazil  59.1,  Kazakhstan  31.3,  Thailand  43.2, 
Malaysia 49.2, Turkey 40.0. (UNDP 2004: 188-91). Some data are for income and others for consumption, some per 
person but others per household. 
22‘Without our adjustment’ (fn. 20 above), ‘there is a significant (uptrend in the ratio of urban to rural mean income) 
at 4.7% per year… However, (after our adjustment the trend) drops to (2.1% per year) and is not (statistically) 
significantly different from zero…(T)he ratio..was rising (in) 1986-94 (and) the late 1990s (but) fell sharply in the 
mid-1990s’ (Ravallion and Chen 2004).    10 
since  1977,  and  especially  since  the  late  1980s,  showed  strong  and  potentially  divisive 
divergence. The coastal regions, initially better off, developed faster. Coastal provinces enjoyed 
preferential policies from the central government, partly to accelerate growth by building on 
their  favourable  geographical  and  transport  conditions.  These  conditions  thus  became  even 
more favourable and attractive for traders and investors. When liberalisation of trade and FDI 
came,  therefore,  they  therefore  further  amplified  the  advantage  of  coastal  regions.  Another 
paper in this project (Venables 2005) explores these processes, and the policy options, more 
fully. 
 
Meanwhile, rural people in remote provinces could not, by migrating, fully correct for this 
growing gap. Rural-urban differences within provinces were greatest in the remote provinces 
(Figure 11). From rural areas there, labour and household migration, especially to big cities, was 
impeded by policies, access rules (hukou), and limited education, information and urban social 
networks. Bhattasali et al. (2005) and Venables (2005) show a big impact of hukou and rural 
under-education in denying poor provinces gains from freer internal and external liberalisation 
(on policy options see also Sec. 4 (c) (ii) below).  
 
Table 9 summarises the regional economic development indicators. East China has the highest 
per capita GDP, nearly twice that of Northwest China. Figure 10 shows that the per capita GDP 
ratio of the wealthiest province to the poorest province fell from about 10:1 to about 8:1 in 
1980-84, during the agricultural wave of liberalisation and the start of the RE-UNSS wave. In 
1984-91 the ratio levelled off around 8-8.5:1. It then rose sharply through the 1990s as further 
manufacturing  growth  raised  relative  income  in  the  booming  coastal  towns  and  their 




(d) Growth, inequality and rural poverty reduction 
 
High inequality of assets (especially farmland and education), and perhaps of income, may 
come to retard growth in developing countries (Barro 2000, Eastwood and Lipton 2000a); and 
growth  is  the  main  engine  for  poverty  reduction.  Further,  rising  inequality  reduces  such 
transmission, by offsetting the anti-poverty effects of past growth. Also rising inequality, unless 
reversed, means that future growth, even if proportionate to starting income will do less for the 
poor. The 60 percent of the population – and over 90 percent of the poor – who live in the 
countryside are specially harmed by rising rural and rising rural-urban inequality, and also by 
rising regional inequality, given that the poorer and slower-growing regions already have the 
highest shares of population in rural areas, and (Fig. 11) the largest rural-urban ratios.  
 
The changes in China’s inequality over past two decades therefore do much to explain changes 
in both rural poverty incidence and the distribution of the poor across regions. Firstly, as shown 
above, rising rural, regional, and probably rural-urban inequality since the late 1980s has partly 
offset the effects of growth on poverty reduction. As expected, after economic growth rates are 
controlled for, poverty incidence fell more slowly in provinces with a higher urban-rural mean-
income ratio (Huang, Rozelle and Zhang 2004), or with a higher within-rural Gini index (MOA, 
2003). Secondly, widened regional inequality means that, in 1985-2002, the trend rate of decline 
in poverty incidence was 17 percent per year for the coastal provinces, but only 8 percent per 
year for inland provinces. 8 percent is still well above what most other poor countries achieved, 
but some of the poorest provinces (e.g. Xinjiang) did much worse, and data for Tibet, probably 
the poorest of all and a slow improver, are not available. 
  
                                                 
23Figure 10 shows a sharp fall in the ratio in China in 2002, immediately after joining the WTO. This is not enough to 
say whether inter-provincial inequality has now begun to fall. Trends in the coefficient of variation of mean province 
income are similar, though somewhat less dramatic (Figure 11). For similar conclusions on levels and trends of 
regional inequality in China, see Cai and Lin 2004; Ravallion and Chen 2004; and Sachs and Woo, 2000. An up-to-
date review is Venables (2005: 1-2).   11 
(e) No trade-off between growth rate and equality 
 
We have seen that richer places (coast, cities) grew faster than poorer ones. At national level, 
China’s economic growth was accompanied by rising income inequality. But growth did not 
cause inequality. Periods with faster growth did not show faster increases in inequality (Table 
10). However, the composition of growth is implicated. If (and when) growth was focused on 




Since  faster  growth  as  such  does  not  aggravate  inequality  in  China,  it  appears  possible  to 
achieve pro-poor growth in which poverty incidence falls rapidly. Inequality has risen sharply 
alongside, but not because of, rapid growth. ‘With the same growth rate over 1981–2001 and no 
rise in inequality, the number of poor… would have been less than one quarter of its actual 
value  in  2001’  (Ravallion  and  Chen,  2004:  3).  The  task  is  to  improve  the  distribution, 
composition and location of growth, not to slow it down.  
 
(f) Liberalisations and inequality: some policy pointers 
 
In China, both economic growth and inequality increased after the initiation of market-based 
economic reforms. Some wrongly conclude that the reforms should be praised for all the extra 
growth, and/or blamed for widening inequality, and more generally, for all other adverse events 
after the reforms, such as the malfunctioning of rural health care systems. To avoid further 
aggravation  of  inequality,  it  is  suggested,  China  should  delay  or  even  reverse  the  trend  of 
liberalisation. However, just as it is unfair to credit liberalisation with all the subsequent growth 
– much was due to earlier State interventions (e.g. financing of irrigation, roads, education, and 
seed research) – so it is unfair to blame liberalisation for all adverse events afterwards. As in 
India (Sen 1997), so in China: to address deep inequalities, it is counter-productive to protect 
established market power by refusing to liberalise; instead, further liberalisations are needed, 
but together with purposive state action so that poor people and regions benefit from them. 
 
Core liberalisation (Chapter 1) implies derestricting markets so that: (1) agents can gain access 
to market to buy and sell, and (2) factor owners can fully make use of their endowment (for 
poor people, mainly their labour-power) to earn income. Withdrawal of State services is seldom 
part of the core. It sometimes helps liberalisation, but often harms the prospects of poor people 
to gain from it.
25 
 
As far as rural and agricultural development is concerned, core liberalisations gave farmers the 
rights to independently decide how much and what to produce, and allowed them to sell at 
market prices instead of lower procurement prices. Core liberalisations also permitted farmers to 
engage in off-farm activities on the basis of their comparative advantage. As a result, more and 
more rural people find off-farm jobs through migrating to urban areas, or are employed by REs, 
or run self-employment enterprises – impossible under the pre-liberalised system. Without 
these  market-enlarging  liberalisations,  poverty  reduction,  and  more  generally  rural  and 
agricultural  development,  since  1977  would  have  been  much  less.  However,  for  want  of 
purposive state action alongside liberalisation, (a) some large and capital-intensive operators – 
even  in  agriculture,  but  especially  in  manufacturing  –  have  gained  market  and  non-market 
power, probably at the cost of poor entrepreneurs and employees;
26 (b) remote, rural, minority 
and less-educated groups have been denied opportunities to gain from liberalisation. Purposive 
                                                 
24This does not imply that, to cut poverty, all areas should raise the agricultural share in growth. For policy options, 
see sec. 4. 
25In much of Africa, the closing of parastatals selling farm inputs – often inefficiently or corruptly – left farmers in 
remote areas with no fertiliser or improved-seed suppliers, and hence few prospects to raise output in response to 
price liberalisation, 
26For example, large private and state organisations have used state or private power to push efficient farmers off their 
land.   12 
state action and market freedom are set up as ‘stage enemies’ by ideologies from the old US-
Soviet cold war. Yet to serve the interests of poor people in remote areas, they can and should 
be allies. 
 
Because there are huge variations in geographic locations and other exogenous factors, some 
regions and social groups will get more benefit from core liberalisation. If these gainers were 
better off initially, that will increase inequality. However, when growth is as fast as has been the 
case in China, nearly all regions and groups gain absolutely from most liberalisation. After 
China’s  accession  to  WTO,  agricultural  trade  liberalisation  will  raise  real  income  (via 
production and consumption effects together) more for richer farm households in the eastern 
coastal areas, but will benefit all types of household – rich and poor, coastal and inland (Huang 
et al 2004) – if rapid growth continues. There is, however, no guarantee that global conditions 
will  permit  this.  If  not,  absolute  losers  from  liberalisation  may  well  emerge.  Prevention, 
insurance or compensation for such losses may become necessary to keep mass support for 
liberalisation. Careful modelling suggests small short-term (2001-7) losses to poor households 
from WTO accession in some regions, mainly the NE, but also that these small losses would be 
turned  into  substantial  net  gains  by  hukou  reform  or  better  rural  education  –  each  helping 
displaced poor farmers to migrate more readily to new trade-induced opportunities (Chen and 
Ravallion 2005, Sicular and Zhao 2005, Hertel et al. 2005). 
 
In the process of economic reforms, apart from ‘core’ liberalisations, the Chinese government 
also implemented many other reforming policies. The unequalising effects of liberalisations will 
be offset or overcome, if these ‘reforming policies’ (1) help relatively disadvantaged people to 
seize the opportunities brought by ‘core-meaning’ liberalisations (for example, by helping the 
poor to resettle from unpromising remote regions, by retraining less educated rural labourers, 
etc),  and  (2)  facilitate  constructing  a  ‘safety-net’  to  compensate  the  poor  losers  from  new 
competition following  liberalisation.  However, some  policies  – including  some  alleged,  but 
certainly not core, liberalisations – hamper or even reverse the potential equalising effects of 
core liberalisations and may also reduce the growth effects. 
 
Firstly, the government has tended to identify health and education services as market-
orientated business, and has moved far towards fee-for-service to ‘reform’ them; and has 
also economised on transport infrastructures for remote provinces. Without good health 
and  education  or  professional  training,  poor  people  cannot  fully  access  and  participate  in 
markets. During the post-reform era, private expenditure for medical treatment has been rising 
(World  Bank  1998),  but  the  poor  cannot  afford  such  expenditure,  and  medical  providers 
therefore concentrate on the medical needs, and locations, of the non-poor. In rural areas, per-
person public investment in health care is only about one-fifth of that in urban areas (Fan et al 
2002). Fee-for-services increases the probability that rural people, once ill, will become poor, as 
their income is reduced both by enforced idleness and by payments for medical treatment. Even 
worse, some farmers are forced to give up treatment because they cannot pay for it. Also, those 
too poor to afford necessary education or training – or their children – have little chance of new 
off-farm job opportunities following liberalisation. Fee-for-services ‘reforms’ of basic health 
services and education harm the poor, increase inequality, and may cut even the GNP gains 
from liberalisation by stopping a segment of the people from competing in liberalised markets. 
This is not to denigrate the case for seeking incentives, financial savings, and participation even 
in basic health and education, but individual fee-for-service has in many countries proved a 
counter-productive and inegalitarian path to such aims.
27 Similarly, low government outlay on 
transport infrastructure has left China with considerably fewer, and worse, roads per unit of 
population,  GDP  and  area  than  relevant  Asian  comparators,  and  remote  areas  (sometimes 
lacking  rail  links)  have  suffered  most,  with  large  and  quantifiable  harm  to  their  growth 
                                                 
27Waivers for people designated poor, also tried in many countries, tend to exclude many needy people, and to be 
administratively costly and corruption-prone. Fee-for-service in Chinese practice has also discriminated against rural 
people.   13 
(Demurger et al. 2001, Chan et al. 2005, Venables 2005) – and probably on poorer people’s 
capacity to migrate and thus seize opportunities offered by liberalisation. 
 
Secondly,  the  government  has  intentionally  or  unintentionally  given  policy  priority  to 
certain  sectors,  or  assigned  more  power  to  certain  social  groups.  In  the  ideal  case, 
opportunities  –  not  necessarily  outcomes  –  following  liberalisation  should  be  distributed 
independently of a person’s region, sector or social group. For complex reasons, even before 
liberalisation some social groups enjoyed more power over others. This enabled them to bend 
the results of (and the rules for) liberalisation to favour themselves, and to ensure that other 
people assumed the cost of ‘reforms’. For example, in the name of promoting local economic 
development and urbanisation, in some regions local officials requisition farmlands and sell 
them at very low prices to real estate companies. Such officials may get high returns from the 
deal, but often poor farmers lose their most important productive asset, land, with no or little 
compensation. In some regions local officials approve investment in high-pollution industries 
without permission from villagers. Again, incoming firms and officials share economic rent, but 
the already vulnerable suffer worse health and may be caught in a poverty trap.  
 
Thirdly, hukou (registration of a household in its place of origin) is still unchanged in most 
regions, stopping rural people from enjoying similar economic and social rights as urban 
residents, and is detrimental to free labour mobility. For example, under hukou, in urban 
areas rural immigrants cannot enjoy the insurance and health services as urban residents do. The 
children of rural employees in urban area are also prohibited from attending local schools.  
 
Finally,  the  government  does  little  to  compensate  those  who  become  ‘net  losers’  in 
liberalisations.  If hukou is abolished as the Premier has foreshadowed, some settled urban 
workers, often with few alternatives, will lose privileges, though in this case retraining and 
resettlement  are  more  appropriate  than  compensation.  Second,  though  agricultural  trade 
liberalisation on average will benefit rural people in all income categories and regions, some 
remote  and  immobile  farmers  who  are  ‘stuck’,  due  to  agro-ecological  reason,  with  the 
production of less-competitive land-intensive crops, will lose as protection is wound down in 
the next decade (Huang et al. 2004). Third, since the 1990s, urban reforms and consequent 
increased competition have resulted in soaring financial losses for many state- and collective-
owned enterprises, and an increasing number of urban workers have been laid off. The existing 
social  safety-net  programs  do  not  adequately  compensate  many  of  these  workers  (Fan  and 
Chan-Kang  2005)  and  are  severely  biased  against  rural  areas,  where  the  poor  concentrate 
(Hussain 2005).  
 
 Although the above policies are not the heart of liberalisation, and may even go in the opposite 
direction since they inhibit weak groups from engaging in markets, some people lump them 
together into the core-meaning of liberalisation – to which their negative effects on poverty and 
inequality are then attributed. Yet CL by itself is not the cause of rising inequality, but opens the 
market so that more people can raise their income using the new opportunities, While there are 
inevitably  losers  from  this,  it  underpins  China’s  robust  economic  growth,  rapid  poverty 
reduction, and profound economic and social changes over past two decades. On the other hand, 
whether liberalisation can evenly benefit different groups depends partly on what other policies 
the government pursues. If the government does not perform, or performs badly, its functions to 
ensure that groups in weak positions can access new market opportunities, or does too little to 
reasonably  compensate  net  losers  from  liberalisation,  poverty  reduction  will  be  slower  and 
inequality will rise. Experience in many countries shows that if those ‘left out’, or falling back, 
concentrate in specific areas or minority groups, the effect can destabilise growth and the polity 
itself.   14 
Chapter 3. Regional poverty and inequality: the rural component 
 
 
In China, it is almost entirely in rural places – especially those most dependent on farming, yet 
with sparse infrastructure and farm water
28 – that extreme poverty and its accompaniments (bad 
education,  health  and  nutrition)  remain  substantial.  Continuing,  and  since  1980  probably 
deepening, relative rural disadvantage characterises much of Asia (Eastwood and Lipton 2000), 
despite  overall  growth,  poverty  reduction,  and  some  liberalising  correction  of  price  biases 
against agriculture. 
 
China’s poor provinces tend to have higher rural shares in population, more rural dependence on 
agriculture, and tougher agricultural conditions. This, and nationally widening rural-urban gaps, 
largely explain China’s growing regional component of poverty and inequality. A reduction, say 
by  half,  in  inter-provincial  gaps  in  mean  income  would,  even  if  within-province  inequality 
stayed the same, greatly reduce overall inequality and hence poverty.
 29 Conversely, widening 
gaps between coastal and Western areas – even since 1985, when these gaps were already large 
–  bear  much  responsibility  for  China’s  increasing  inequality  and  persistent  (though  falling) 
poverty.  
 
In many otherwise successful countries, growth creates, and may exacerbate, the problem of 
regional ‘islands’ of rural poverty. There, most households are stranded far from the mainstream 
–  both  of  fast  growth,  and  of  substantial  local  poverty  reduction  per  unit  of  growth  –  by 
‘interlocking log-jams’. Correlated absences of good health, information, under-education and 
assetlessness reinforce each other locally to keep poverty high (de Haan and Lipton 1999). In 
China,  these  problems  are  increasingly  concentrated  in  rural  Western  and  West-Central 
provinces. As in other countries (Pakistan, Peru), this is in part due to ‘spatial poverty traps’.
30 
These exist where  – given the level of household characteristics affecting poverty risk (head’s 
years of education, child/adult ratio, etc.)  – location greatly increases poverty risk. Literacy, 
health and information help a poor person less in areas with few sources of modern employment 
or up-to-date information. ‘Wrong’ location also makes it harder for people and communities to 
acquire the household characteristics that assist the escape from poverty, either in place (by 
improved agriculture and/or rural non-farm activity) or via urbanisation. It is harder to become 
literate, healthy and informed in a remote area, where good teachers, clinics, roads and Internet 
cafés are scarce.  
 
There are policy options to attack this growing rural/regional interlock of persistent poverty and 
gross inequality (ch. 4). Evidence from elsewhere is that – while core liberalisation (market 
freeing and access), institutions and social investments matter – they may not, on their own, free 
the poor from rural poverty islands. Also needed are asset-based and technology-based measures 
to raise both productivity of, and demand for, the labour of the poor (IFAD 2001). Historically, 
in places of widespread mass poverty, this process has almost always started in agriculture.  
 
Within this sector, remote and poor people often need higher staples productivity, to achieve 
local food security, before they are prepared to seek out more lucrative, but riskier, options 
through cash-cropping, local non-farm activities, and urbanisation (IFAD 2001). In China as in 
India, this need in poorer areas for enhanced staples productivity is quite closely linked to a shift 
of cropping patterns that is happening anyway. Rising real water costs, depletion and changing 
consumer demand induce farmers in the advanced (and already largely poverty-free) irrigated 
rural areas shift to higher-value farm and non-farm products. That shift speeds up, as market 
pricing  –  for  water  and  cereals,  plus  environmental  factors  in  rice-wheat  systems,  steadily 
invalidates the use of irrigation for cereals. Especially in big countries with national policies 
                                                 
28In India too, poverty is more (and slower to fall) in unirrigated, drought-prone areas (Rao et al. 1988). 
29This is also true of Indonesia (Huppi and Ravallion 1991a), but not India (Ravallion and Datt 1999). 
30For evidence on China, see (Jalan and Ravallion 1997); on Peru, (de Vreyer. et al. 2003).   15 
unfavourable  to  large  imports  of  staples,  this  means  that  technologies  and  investments  are 
needed for the poorer, usually less well-watered, regions to substantially raise staples production. 
 
(a) Rurality, inequality and persistent poverty 
   
(i) Rural-urban inequality and income poverty: Household surveys show that real private mean 
income (RPMI) about tripled in real terms between 1981 and 2001, both in rural and in urban 
areas. The ratio of urban to rural RPMI stayed around 2.
31  In most Asian countries growth has 
been much slower, and the ratio is somewhat higher and has been rising (Eastwood and Lipton 
2000). Why, then, is it generally agreed that relative rural deprivation is particularly serious in 
China (World Bank 1997)?  First, the urban/rural ratio rose in most of the years 1981-2001. It 
fell only during the agricultural liberalisation (to 1984) and the growth slowdown of 1994-7.  
Second, high rural-urban inequality is worse for the rural poor, if – as in China – intra-rural 
inequality  is  large  by  Asian  standards.  It  has  been  increasing,  despite  China’s  very  equal 
farmland. In the coastal regions fast urban growth has been matched by rural growth. However, 
the  poverty-crescent  rural  regions  (p.  16)  have  done  less  well,  due  to  large  (and  growing) 
disparities in value-added per hectare among areas; to the large and rapidly rising share in rural 
income  of  non-farm  income,  which  has  increasingly  been  both  distributed  more  unequally 
among persons and provinces than farm income (Tables 5-6; Howes and Hussain 1994); and 
possibly  (as  in  India)  to  a  rising  proportion  of  rural  households  suffering  forms  of 
unemployment,
32 as farm growth slows and becomes less labour-using. High, rising within-rural 
inequality (as compared to within-urban) implies that – though urban mean income in 1981-
2001 has stayed at about twice rural – the multiple for median income has been higher, and 
rising. So a typical Chinese household rightly sees a high and rising rural-urban income ratio. 
Rapid growth, while good in itself, transforms this rising ratio into a larger, and much faster-
rising, absolute gap between urban and rural median incomes.
33 
 
Third, the capacity of rising rural mean private income (RPMI) at national level to cut poverty 
has been impaired because RPMI grew more slowly in most of the poorest provinces (see next 
sub-section). As in India (Dyson et al. 2004), so in China: rising proportions of the rural poor 
are  being  ‘crowded’  into  regions  with  slower  growth,  higher  rates  of  natural  increase  of 
population, slower urbanisation, and low responsiveness of poverty to growth. Rural ‘islands of 
chronic  deprivation’  are  emerging  ever  more  clearly.  China’s  rural  poverty  islands  contain 
smaller  (and  less  densely  settled)  proportions  of  the  population  than  in  India,  but  their 
population is growing faster (chapter 3, (a) (iv)).  
 
Fourth, apart from income, rural areas have sunk deeper into relative assetlessness (chapter. 2, 
sec. (b)). In 1995-2002, assets (net of liabilities) per person rose by 237 percent in urban areas, 
but in rural areas by only 13 percent. Hence 1995-2002 saw sharp rises in the ratio of urban to 
rural net asset value per person (from 1.2 in 1995 to 3.6 in 2002: Table 8). Worryingly, the slow 
rise in rural mean asset values plus a sharp rise in intra-rural asset inequality
34  (Table 7) implies 
that the rural income-poor averaged absolutely lower net asset value in 2002 than in 1995. There 
                                                 
31Rural RPMI (in 1980 prices) rose in 1981-2001 from 218.2 to 642.6 RMB. Urban RPMI rose from 486.3 to 1565.2 
RMB with official deflators, but from 407.2 to 1102.0 RMB when deflated by a re-estimated, faster-rising urban cost-
of-living index. The ratio of urban to rural mean income rose from 2.23 to 2.44 with official urban deflators, but fell 
from 1.87 to 1.72 on the new estimates (NBSC 2003; Ravallion and Chen, 2004, table 1). Neither deflator gives a 
statistically significant time-trend in the ratio. 
32Wang Jian (2003), a research fellow of the State Development and Reform Commission, wrote: ‘I estimate China’s 
aggregate unemployment rate to be 12-15 percent if all unemployed people and rural surplus labourers who have not 
transferred from the agricultural sector to other sectors are included. Calculated on the basis of China having 730 
million employed people at the end of 2001, its unemployed totals around 100 million’ (our italics). 
33Correspondingly, income-per-head at $200 a year in urban, and $100 in rural, areas – a $100/year gap – seldom 
allows urban households to afford a conspicuous, desirable durable – a TV or washing machine – that their rural 
counterparts cannot.  When incomes per head triple to $600 (urban) and $300 (rural) – a $300/year gap – that changes!  
34The poorest quintile’s share in rural assets fell from 7.8% to 5.2% (Li, Wei and Ding 2005)    16 
was less to sell, or to use as collateral for loans, to maintain current consumption in bad times. 
That raises the risk of falling into, or deeper into,  rural poverty. It also makes it harder to get 
out:  the  asset-poor  can  seldom  take  risks,  or  borrow,  to  obtain  or  increase  income  during 
liberalisation. If farmland were a secure private asset, rural people might fare better; but it is not. 
Rural  land  insecurity  when  farmland  is  alienated,  often  without  compensation,  by  local 
authorities for housing or factory development is probably a further source of rural poverty. 
 
Hence, while rural private-income poverty has fallen sharply, in 2001 about 1 in 4 rural Chinese 
were dollar-poor.
35 This is partly for the above reasons, and partly because growth of rural 
RPMI  in  1980-2001  (3.36%/year:  Ravallion  and  Chen  2004,  table  16)  –  while  rapid  by 
historical and regional standards – was far less than the 8.2%/ year growth of mean national PPP 
GDP per person. The issue then remains: how far did the very fast growth in non-private-
income  GDP  (in  investment  and/or  public  consumption)  relieve  rural  poverty  and  relative 
deprivation by supplementing rural private income with public provision? 
  
(ii) Health: China, like Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, and the Indian State of Kerala, is renowned for 
providing  health  care  to  the  poor  far  in  advance  of  the  norm  for  low-to-middle-income 
countries; the results show in lower mortality and morbidity. However, rural health conditions 
are  worse  than  urban,  and  the  gap  has  widened.  Imposition  of  fee-for-service,  and  partial 
privatisation of health care, have gone further in rural areas, and are partly responsible for the 
slower improvement – especially in remote areas – than in cities.
36 In 2000, rural male Chinese 
had life expectancy 7.4 percent (5.6 years) below urban levels; for females the shortfall was 8 
percent  (6.3  years).  ‘In  1981, the  gaps  were 5  and  6  percent,  and in 1989-90,  3.6  and  5.5 
percent’, and people in ‘China's three centrally controlled municipalities (could expect to live) 
about ten years longer than (in) China's poorest provinces’ (Feng and Mason 2005: 27-9). Rural 
pollution, largely in the home from dung-fuelled fires and stoves, plays a part: deaths from 
respiratory disease ‘nearly doubled in rural China between 1980 and 2000, rising from 79 to 142 
per 100,000, and became the leading cause of death in the last decade’.
37 The infant mortality 
rate among the poorest rural quartile was 3.5 times higher than among city dwellers (Lebrun 
2003).  
 
(iii)  Nutrition:  The  key  to  child,  and  hence  adult,  health  is  nutrition.  This  too  has  shown 
dramatic  overall  improvement.  In  1990-2002  China  more  than  halved  overall  underweight, 
stunting and wasting among under-fives.. Yet they remain ‘systematically higher in rural areas’ 
and the rural-urban malnutrition gap is widening.
38 New evidence shows that early malnutrition 
raises the risks of fatal infections in middle age, and of heart disease and diabetes then and 
later.
39 Hence China’s chances to manage the ‘health transition’ and the so-called diseases of 
affluence requires, not redirection of resources away from rural areas and disadvantaged groups 
and regions, and thus from remaining child malnutrition, but on attacking such malnutrition. 
Core liberalisation does not require fees or systems that reduce poor rural people’s access 
                                                 
3516.6% of all Chinese fell below PPP 1$/day in 2001, the latest year with full survey data (UNDP 2004: 147). Urban 
poverty was tiny. In 2002 39% (Census) or 27% (hukou) of China‘s people were urban  (China Statistical Yearbook 
2003, table 13-3, 4-1). 
36‘There is a big gap between the facilities…in the big cities and…in poorer rural areas. In theory, basic health care is 
available free to everybody. In practice, however, medical care is being increasingly commercialised’ (FAO 1999). 
Among the 15 percent of NDPC patients unable to get timely treatment, 30 percent report excessive distance to 
hospital (MOA 2004). 
37 ‘In urban areas, (as a cause of death, respiratory diseases) ranked fourth, after cancer, cerebrovascular, and heart 
diseases. In 2000, the death rate in rural China due to injury, trauma, and toxicosis more than doubled as compared 
with 1980, and was twice as high compared with urban areas’ (Feng and Mason 2004: 30. 
38FAO 1999. In 1996, of children under 6, on the criterion of >2SD below NCHS norms,  9.0% were underweight for 
age in urban areas and 15.8% in rural areas; the corresponding figures for stunting (height-for-age) were 13.9% and 
21.5%,  and  for  wasting  (weight-for-height)  2.1%  and  2.9%.  ADB  (2000),  citing  National  Food  and  Nutrition 
Surveillance, reports that in 1990-2000  underweight among under-fives fell from 8.6% to 3.0% in urban areas, but 
only from 14.0% to 10.9% rurally, so again the absolute and relative rural-urban shortfall increased.  
39Respectively, the 50-year panel of Medical Research Council data in the Gambia, and the growing evidence for the 
‘Barker hypothesis’ (UN-SCN 2004; UN ACC/SCN 2000; Lipton 2001).   17 
to preventive or basic curative health/nutrition care. The consequences of such reduction 
harm well-being, growth, and the consensus on which stable and steady liberalisation depend.  
 
(iv) Demographics: Better health and nutrition, and hence child survival prospects – together 
with  educational  and  income  opportunities  –  induce  fertility  reduction,  and  hence  the 
demographic transition, with its sharp fall in the dependency ratio: the ratio of (young and old) 
dependants to people of prime working and saving age (15-65). In China and elsewhere in East 
Asia, this fall contributed about 1.7% to annual income-per-head growth in 1960-92 (Bloom and 
Williamson  1998)  –  and  perhaps  twice  as  much  to  poverty  reduction,  due  to  distributional 
effects (Eastwood and Lipton 1999). However, urban China has largely completed its transition; 
increasing proportions of over-65s already offset falling proportions of children, so that the 
projected urban dependency ratio is stable at 0.35 from 2001 to 2015. The rural dependency 
ratio, however, is projected to continue to fall, from 0.49 to 0.38 in that period (Feng and Mason 
2005a).  This  ‘demographic  gift’,  as  more  workers  have  to  support  fewer  dependents,  will 
happen only if – and where – improving prospects for children’s survival, nutrition, health, 
education and work persuade potential parents to reduce fertility and to ‘substitute quality for 
quantity’. Policy choices by the Government of China will determine whether rural and regional 
health conditions enable that future. 
 
(v) Education: Rural areas lag far behind. In the mid-1990s 61.3 percent of rural persons over 
15 had primary education or less, as against only 19.3 percent in urban areas (Knight and Song 
1999). In 2002, over 1 in 10 of the world’s adult illiterates were Chinese, and about 90 percent 
of China’s illiterates were rural (People’s Daily 2002), as against 61 percent of the population.   
 
(vi) Why the gaps? The same unit of health and education provision (e.g. a hospital of given 
size)  is  costlier  to  provide  in  villages,  especially  in  remote  areas.  However,  these  places 
normally have cheaper forms of provision per unit of care (e.g. clinics, not teaching hospitals) 
than towns, so this cannot explain much of China’s revealed preference for urban provision. 
That preference may well have gone too far. China’s large and growing rural-urban gaps in 
health, education (and hence in the demographic transition) and transport mean that extra public 
resources yield much higher welfare returns, if shifted substantially towards rural areas and 
populations.
40 In a liberalising framework, such a shift would operate mainly through motivation, 
professional consensus, and incentives. However, it is not part of ‘liberalisation’ to insist that 
schools or clinics should be increasingly financed through charges – whether for public servi-
ces or otherwise. Such charges are harder to pay, and often higher, for villagers and remote 
dwellers than for townsfolk. The latter, too, are typically better off, less ill, and with conditions 
less cheaply curable.
41   
 
(b) Regional poverty and inequality: facts, markets, options 
 
(i) Rural mean income divergence among provinces: Nationally, surveyed real private mean 
income (RPMI) in rural areas doubled in 1980-2001, rising at 3.36% per year. However, the 
regional  pattern  of  growth  widened  the  gaps  among  the  28  provinces  with  cost-of-living-
corrected survey data (Table 11; Ravallion and Chen 2004).
42 In 1980 rural RPMI was only 2.8 
times higher in the top province, Shanghai, than in the lowest scorer, Sha’anxi; by 2001 this 
multiple  (now  between  Shanghai  and  Yunnan)  had  soared  to  6.4.
43 Tibet  apart,  he  eight 
                                                 
40Rural returns and poverty reduction exceed urban for extra outlay on schools (Fan et al. 2000) and roads (Fan and 
Kang 2005). 
41There is evidence that charging, or allowing charging, at full cost-recovery prices is both efficient and pro-poor for 
water,  and  neither  for  primary  social  services  (health  care  and  education):  see 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/wobadi/338.html; on health, Decosas (2005) and WHO, ESA (2003); on education, Kattan 
and Burnett (2004) and Vanus and Williams (2002). Yet in China rural users are increasingly charged for primary 
health and education, but (despite irrigation reform) seldom for water. 
42Excluding Hainan – and Xizang (Tibet), clearly the poorest province but lacking the cost-of-living adjuster. 
43All data in this and next paragraph calculated from Ravallion and Chen 2004, tables 13-14. Coefficients of variation 
increased much less, but the poorest provinces fell further behind: compare Figure 10.   18 
provinces with lowest rural RPMI in 1980 were, in order, Sha’anxi (ranking 28
th, with growth in 
1980-2001  at  2.4%/year),  Yunnan  (1.1%),  Gansu  (3.7%),  Qinghai  (3.0%),  Henan  (3.5%), 
Shanxi (4.2%), Guizhou (2.1%) and Hubei (2.6%). Thus, in most of the poor provinces, rural 
RPMI grew in 1980-2001 at well below the all-China rate. By 2001, six were still among the 
eight with lowest rural RPMI, except that Shanxi and Hubei had been replaced by Xinjiang and 
Ningxia.
44   By  2001,  a  ‘West-Central  poverty  crescent’,  comprising  Henan,  Sha’anxi, 
Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan and Guizhou , had been clearly confirmed as 
the stubborn centre of low mean rural income – and, as we shall see, high rural poverty and 
deprivation. High and rising between-province rural inequality (as indicated by spatial gaps in 
rural RPMI
45)in 1980-2001, therefore contributed greatly to  the substantial residual poverty in 
western China.  
 
(ii) Rising rural inequality within poor provinces: Within-province rural inequality weakens 
the impact of growth on poverty (and on median or typical living standards) in two ways. First, 
initial  high  within-province  rural  inequality  means  that  (a)  extra  provincial  income,  if 
distributed like initial income, provides less benefit to the poor or even the median rural person, 
(b) the rural poor tend to be well below the poverty line. Second, growing within-province 
inequality reduces, over time, the gains to median income-receivers, and even more to the poor, 
from a given volume of extra provincial income.  
 
Since 1983, the first effect – initial within-province rural inequality as a brake on converting 
growth into disimpoverishment – has not been very important in China, because in 1980-84 
such  inequality  was  low.  It  lay  well  below  rural  inequality  within  provinces  of  India  or 
Indonesia, let alone Brazil. The earliest available within-province rural private income Ginis 
ranged from 0.18 (Jiangxi 1983) to 0.33 (Xinjiang and Qinghai 1988), with half below .23. The 
provinces with lowest rural RPMI followed the same range (Ravallion and Chen 2004: tables 
13-14).  
 
The second effect – rising rural inequality that siphoned growth away from the poor – was 
important in slowing poverty reduction, especially regionally. By 2001, most provinces had seen 
sharp rises in their rural private income Ginis; they now ranged from.23 to .40. Ginis had soared 
in some of the eight lowest-RPMI ‘West-Central poverty crescent’ provinces, rising in 1983-91 
at 2.6% per year in Yunnan and 2.4% in Sha’anxi. Such trends seriously reduced the impact of 
1983-2001 growth on poverty and living standards. Also, they meant that by 2001 quite high 
rural inequality had emerged within several of the eight low-RPMI provinces: Qinghai and 
Xinjiang (respectively with second-lowest and fifth-lowest rural RPMI of the 28 provinces) 
each had China’s highest rural Gini, .40 – probably a substantial underestimate.
46  Such high 
income Ginis hamper the ability of future growth to pull up poor and median rural people.  
 
(iii) Poverty divergence among regions: Tables 4 and 11 show the upshot for regional poverty 
reduction. The proportion of rural poor below the official food poverty line (with recalculated 
deflators: Ravallion and Chen 2004) in 2001 was 12.5 percent; at the dollar-a-day line it was 
double.
47 Rural poverty remained much higher in the nine low-rural-RPMI provinces of the 
West-Central crescent. Table 4 suggests little improvement since 2001 at all-China level, but 






                                                 
44Due to very slow growth (0.97%/year), Xinjiang fell from 7
th  to 24
th in the ranking of provinces by rural RPMI. 
45These are underestimated by our data, as many provinces are huge and populous, and may have big internal spatial 
differences in rural RPMI.  However, we have no finer-mesh RPMI data, e.g. at county level, on an all-China basis.  
46Experience in many developing countries is that the richest 1% is very under-represented in household surveys.  
47As urban incidence was only 0.5%, this meant a national ERPI of about 8% at the new official line.   19 
Furthermore, panel surveys show that the ‘chronic’ share in poverty – the proportion of the poor 
below the poverty line in repeated survey rounds – is a higher proportion of total poverty in the 
Western crescent than elsewhere (Chronic Poverty Report 2004).
48 This suggests two things. 
First,  ‘spatial  poverty  traps’  are  created  by  characteristics  of  the  area,  rather  than  just  the 
household  (Jalan  and  Ravallion  1997).  Second,  (b)  rural  characteristics  of  people  in  poor 
households  –  above-average  child/adult  ratios,  below-average  literacy  and  proportions  of 
working time spent off the farm – are partly caused by characteristics of the region. Certainly, 
characteristics of households in the poor Western region, and of poor households within each 
region, are similar (Table 5).  
 
(iv) Characteristics of poor people in poor provinces: There is a logic to this overlap between 
characteristics of poor people and regions (Tables 5-7). Higher child/adult ratios reflect higher 
fertility.  International  evidence  shows  that  earlier  marriage  and  higher  marital  fertility  are 
normal responses to life in either households or regions with (a) higher child mortality (and thus 
its causes, poor health and nutrition); (b) briefer education and lower literacy, especially for 
women; (c) less income from rural non-farm earnings (Livi-Bacci and de Santis 1999; Birdsall 
et al. 2001). All these parts of the ‘interlocking log-jam’ of poverty mean that women see 
motherhood as involving little income loss, and parents see limited hope for their child to earn 
high income in healthy adulthood. So they ‘substitute quantity for quality’ in planning a family. 
So poor households, in chronically poor regions, tend to have workforces with few workers and 
savers relative to dependent children (Table 5); bad health and education; and thus restricted 
opportunities to escape poverty by saving, migration, or diversification out of farming.  
 
Further, much of the West-Central poverty crescent is remote from trade routes, deficient in 
information, and  hence lacking  ready  access  to  potential  gains  from  liberalisation.  Add  the 
difficulty of achieving rapid farm growth with the West-Central crescent’s (usually unirrigated, 
often hilly) land base; the known dependence of early rural non-farm growth (especially of the 
pro-poor,  employment-intensive  type)  on  prior  agricultural  advance  (Hazell  and  Ramasamy 
1991); and the constraints of low education and transport (and perhaps language, culture and 
discrimination)  against  effective  labour  migration  –  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  despite 
‘spectacular…poverty  reduction  in  China  since  1978…  the  locus  of  poverty…has  shifted 
radically to the western areas of China…consistent with the… State Council(’s)  decision to 
revise national poverty policy’ (ADB 2003). Other large, diverse developing countries have the 
same  experience that even  quite rapid  progress leaves  regional-rural poverty  islands [IFAD 
2001].  Venables  (2005),  drawing  on  Chinese  and  EU  evidence,  suggests  that  if  internal 
liberalisation, too, proves inadequate for ‘reducing the widest regional disparities’, the reason 
lies with policy (e.g. favouring richer provinces, maintaining hukou, underinvesting in education 
and transport from poor regions. However, before reviewing policy options for improvement 
during liberalisation, we must explore China’s regional non-income deprivation, and the role of 
agriculture, non-farm income and urbanisation.  
 
(v)  Regional  health,  nutrition  and  education  deprivation  and  inequality:  In  2000,  life 
expectancy in much of the West-Central poverty crescent (Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Qinghai) was in the range 64.4-66.0, as against a 71.0 national average.
49. Also, though the 
infant mortality rate fell from 139 in 1954 to 41 in the late 1990s, the rates varied greatly across 
provinces, with Qinghai, Ningxia, Yunnan, Xinjiang and Guizhou worst. As for consequences 
of ill-health, ‘time lost from work due to health problems in poor counties is 2.5 times the 
national rural average’ (Riley 2004; also FAO 1999; UNDP 1997).  
 
Like rural-urban patterns, regional patterns in nutrition track those in health. The prevalence of 
malnutrition  in  young  children  in  the  western  provinces  is  about  double  that  in  the  East.  
                                                 
48From panel data from four southern provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou and Guangdong), almost 60% of rural 
poverty in the three poverty-crescent provinces, but below 20% in Guangdong, is chronic (Ravallion and Jalan 1998). 
49Wang and Mason 2004. Hubei, Henan and Sha’anxi were close to that average. Gansu’s E(0) in 2000 was 67.5.   20 
Undernutrition is worst among rural minorities in mountain areas; belonging to the Miao, Yi and 
Hani  ethnic  groups  compared  with  Han  and  poorer  maternal  child-rearing  behaviour 
significantly increased the risk for stunting of children. Vitamin A deficiency in under-fives was 
highest (over 20 percent in Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Guizhou, and 42 percent in 
Guangxi (ADB 2000; Li et al. 1999).   
 
Regional  disparities  in  education  are  also  wide.  Tibet,  Qinghai,  Guizhou,  Gansu,  Yunnan, 
Ningxia,  Xinjiang  and  Sha’anxi  contain  15  percent  of  China’s  people,  yet  half  the  adult 
illiterates.
50 Concentrations of deprivation do not precisely correspond – Ningxia is worse, but 
Henan better, on health and education than on income and poverty – and for policy priorities a 
county data breakdown would tell us more. Yet the West-Central concentration of deprivation is 
clear. It is similar in scope, persistence and policy significance to the concentration of (more 
widespread and severe) deprivation in India’s East-Central ‘poverty square’ [Drèze and Sen 
1997]. In both countries, regions with worse health and education outcomes not only have fewer 
specialists  and  facilities,  but  also  attract  lower-quality  personnel,  supervision,  popular 
participation, and public responsiveness and perhaps governance. And both countries (ch. 3, sec. 
(a)  (i)),  even  as  they  grow  and  prosper  overall,  face  a  growing  national  impact  from  the 
relatively worse outcomes for deprived regions – because these have rising proportions of the 
remaining  poor,  illiterate,  high-mortality  and  high-fertility  groups,  with  relatively  high 
population growth rates and dependency ratios. 
 
(vi) Can people in poor regions escape? To what extent can the rural poor in the West-Central 
crescent escape? The answer may suggest what policy options best help them. The three escape 
routes are migration, rural non-farm activity, and agriculture {for policy options see Ch. 
4).  
 
The prospects of escape are affected by the fact that regional deprivations together can form a 
log-jam of poverty. Migration prospects, for example, are affected by regional education, health 
and  ethnicity.  World-wide,  rural-to-urban  migrants,  though  typically  less  educated  than  the 
urban average in their age-groups, are more educated than the rural average; conversely, lack of 
education impedes both migration, and migrants’ success in enhancing earnings. So lower levels 
of education in the West-Central poverty crescent (Table 5) reduce prospects for migratory 
escape. These are further affected by membership of minority groups, often with language, 
culture and expectations different from, and perhaps facing discrimination, by, the majority in 
the cities. Non-Han ethnic minorities comprise about 10% of China’s population, yet at least 
‘40%  of the population  (in)Yunnan,  Guangxi,  Qinghai,  Ningxia  and Tibet.  Nationwide,  the 
incidence of poverty in the 257 counties where minority ethnic communities are concentrated is 
typically 20 percent higher than in counties where Han people are the overwhelming majority.’
51 
Such  minority  groups  –  often  not  speaking  the  national  language  (or  at  best  as  a  second 
language), and often less healthy and educated – find migratory escape hard. This by no means 
makes  the  task  hopeless  –  elsewhere,  education  in  the  first  language  removes  most  of  the 
income disadvantage of minority groups (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1993) – but the migrant 
route has limited scope in many poor areas. 
 
Can the poor in the West-Central crescent catch up via agricultural growth? Throughout Asia, 
rapid growth of land and water productivity in agriculture has been the key to regional progress 
out of poverty. Conversely, however, remote, slower-growth, and higher-poverty regions have:  
•  less land measured in efficiency units, and much less irrigation and hence controlled 
water, per farm-based person, than advanced areas, such as Eastern China; 
•  a less labour-intensive farm product-mix, initially and in options for farm growth; 
                                                 
50People’s Daily 2002. It adds that 1 in 10 of the world’s adult  illiterates lives in China. 
51ADB  (2003), para.  281.  ‘In 1996-98 45% of  RMB40 billion  allocated  by  the national  government  to poverty 
reduction was directed at these minority counties. As a consequence, almost 11 mn people and 15 mn domestic 
animals gained access to potable water, 10 mn hectares of new farmland was made available for cultivation, and 
70,000 miles of highway were completed.’    21 
•  a smaller research and science base: in China ‘the Northwest region (Gansu, Sha’anxi, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang) spent much less than coastal areas, and expenditures of 
the latter were stagnant or even declining in the 1990s…It is not surprising that land 
productivity  in  the  Northwest  region  was  lowest  among  all  regions.  The  coastal 
provinces (Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shangdong) experienced the most rapid 
growth in agriculture R&D spending’;
52 
•  a  less-educated  farmer  community  (Table  5),  reducing  efficiency,  innovation  and 
growth (Jamison and Lau 1982). 
In resource-constrained remote upland areas, land is often so bad that few families can feed 
themselves  adequately  from  farming  alone  (World  Bank  1992).  Also,  because  irrigation  is 
harder, scarcer and dearer – in 1993 ‘irrigated area represented 36 percent of cultivated land in 
the non-poor compared to only 18 percent in poverty counties’ – high risk makes farmers less 
willing  to try  new ideas to  escape poverty: ‘In  poor  counties (a  much  lower  proportion  of 
cultivated area) is…not subject to drought or flooding (than) in non-poor counties’.
53  
 
Yet there are real prospects for progress. Fan et al. (2002) show that both rates of return and 
achieved poverty reduction from extra agricultural research – and this also applies to 
rural roads, education and much else – are now higher in some deprived West-Central 
provinces than  in the  agricultural lead  areas of the  South  and  East, where post-green-
revolution diminishing returns have set in. It will be critical (a) that the new possibilities of 
biotechnology are directed towards the needs and insecurities of crops and conditions in the 
West-Central crescent, (b) that there are steps to greatly improve the efficiency of water use – 
not  only  via  water  pricing,  markets,  users’  associations  and  other  aspects  of  ‘water 
liberalisation’, but also via new, accessible and affordable (divisible) water technology, such as 
micro-drip, and new basic water science (IFAD 2001). 
 
Rural non-farm growth, initially mainly through REs, has ‘taken up the baton’ of growth with 
poverty reduction in many rural areas from agriculture, after the winding-down of the rapid 
growth upsurge in 1977-85 (land reform, green revolution, quota liberalisation). This ‘baton 
effect’ is found in many  other Asian countries. Labour-intensive non-farm growth followed 
farm success, with ‘growth linkages’ as small farmers increasingly spend their rising incomes 
on local employment-intensive commodities, especially in trade, construction and transport.
54 
Based on these experiences as well as China’s own, however, there must be some doubt about 
the widespread capacity of rural non-farm growth to remedy regional deprivation without prior, 
local small-farm takeoff to provide the initial demand. The poorer regions’ remoteness renders 
them less attractive for the possible non-farm alternative: rapid small-town and surrounding 
peri-rural industrial cluster development, which characterised take-off in S and E China, as in N 
Italy  and  S  France in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  In  China the  REs in their  early  years  actually 
produced faster income and employment growth in poorer areas than elsewhere, but this was 
reversed after the early 1980s and may have been an unsustainable consequence of directed 
investment or subsidy (Howes 1994). For deprivation in the poorest West-Central areas to be 
addressed by local non-farm  growth, the evidence suggests that there will have to be local 
small-farm output, employment and income growth first. Table 5 shows the poorer West region 
– and, significantly, lower income-per-head households within that region – obtaining far lower 
proportions of income from non-farm sources than in other rural regions.  
                                                 
52Fan et al. (2002), p.20. Their tables show that poorer areas’ agricultural R & D expenditures were also smaller and 
slower-growing per unit of farm output and population.  
53‘Though mean agricultural income in poor counties improved from (about half) average rural income per person in 
1985 to almost two-thirds…in 2000, gains of this order have not been made in the poorest western areas’ (ADB 2003).  
Officially designa-ted ‘poor counties’ map the pattern of poverty badly; surveys show it is much more concentrated 
on NW and SW Provinces. 
54See Hazell and Ramasamy (1991) on North Arcot, India, and Bell, Hazell and Slade (1982) on Muda, Malaysia.   22 
Chapter 4. Policy Options 
 
(a) The situation 
 
China’s growth and poverty reduction in the last thirty years are unequalled for scale, speed and 
duration in world history. Yet in the same period China has turned from one of Asia’s most 
equal countries to one of the least equal. Hence, despite a more than ninefold rise in real GDP 
per person, significant proportions of Chinese remain poor. Many of these are also ill, hungry or 
illiterate.  They  are  increasingly  concentrated  in  rural  West-Central  China,  and  in  minority 
groups. 
 
All these changes have accompanied market opening. This trend will probably continue. So that 
should be the central scenario in assessing policy impact on poverty and inequality. However, 
chosen policies should preferably also provide benefits to the remote and rural poor: 
•  During slowdowns – probably temporary or local – or even reversals in market opening; 
•  In case of downward ‘shocks’ to, or perhaps longer-term slowdowns in, economic growth; 
•  In  face  of  other  ‘macro-trends’  (often  interacting  with  liberalisation),  especially  in 
demographics and water availability, that affect the welfare of poor, remote and rural people; 
•  For large, immobile sub-group and sub-region populations that – even though economic 
growth reduces overall poverty – may lose because unable to adjust to competition. 
 
It  would  be  counter-productive  to  abandon  ‘core  liberalisation’.  This  has  proved  good  for 
growth  and  poverty  reduction  in  China,  as  elsewhere  in  East  Asia.  Because  CL  followed 
agricultural  take-off  and  a  strong,  reasonably  equal-access  build-up  of  physical  and  human 
capital, it has improved the prospects of the poor. Nor would these be helped by abandoning 
monetary and fiscal policies to contain inflation, which has been shown in many studies to harm 
the poor most in the short term, and to reduce growth in the medium term. However, ‘non-core’ 
policies  linked  in  some  countries  to  liberalisation  –    fee-for-service  in  basic  health  and 
education; reduced State provision of public, merit and infrastructural goods; easier and ill-
regulated inflows of volatile ‘hot money’ (Stiglitz 2003) – have helped neither growth nor the 
income share of the poor. They can be discarded even as the core is strengthened. CL needs to 
advance regional and anti-poverty policy, and to be consistent with it. Public or group provision 
of many goods and services – public and merit goods, and some other elements of infrastructure 
– is needed for the poor to use opportunities created by liberalisation.  
 
All this is especially important in remote rural areas. There, lagging education and information, 
transport  and  land-water  development,  interacting  with  linguistic  or  minority-group  issues, 
make it harder for the poor to participate fully in opportunities due to market opening. Apart 
from the inefficiency of excluding groups and areas from competing, and the inequity towards 
those excluded, such exclusion may risk social instability or loss of cohesiveness. This further 
strengthens the case for raising the share and quality of service provision, access and education 
in remote regions, especially their rural areas. 
 
For these areas, there is another important policy pointer from past Chinese growth. It has 
brought huge gains to the rural poor in most of China, not only through higher local incomes 
(initially in agriculture, later in REs), but also because poor people have massively migrated to 
faster-growing areas. The West-Central ‘poverty crescent’ has lagged behind the rest of China – 
both in growth and in its transmission to the rural poor – not only due to slower farm and non-
farm advance, but also because its remote areas had less migration (and migrant remittances). 
Hence  policies  to  cut  rural  poverty  and  inequality  in  China  need  not  only  to  stimulate 
employment-intensive farm and non-farm development in the more promising of the currently 
poor regions, but also to remove artificial barriers to successful migration from them, and to 
improve their share of the transport, information and education services conducive to successful 
migration. 
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(b) Policies for fast growth are good for the poor, but are not the whole story 
 
In  1985-2002,  92  percent  of  the  variance,  among  years,  in  rural  poverty  reduction  was 
associated  with  variance  in  economic  growth;  the  provincial  data  suggest  an  even  stronger 
association (Huang, Rozelle and Zhang 2004). Yet, though faster growth is good for the poor at 
all-China level, some groups and places can be left out, or even lose. The final effects depend 
not only on rapid growth, but also on its composition, and on how its fruits are distributed and 
used.  
 
The general experience of early development, especially in countries with fairly equal farmland, 
is that investment or policy at a given cost, producing an extra $1000 of GDP, is substantially 
more poverty-reducing if that $1000 is in agriculture, because it is more employment-intensive, 
and,  restrains  food  prices.
55  However,  the  choice  of  sectors  is  more  complex  in  later 
development, when smaller proportions of extra income are spent on food, and farms may get 
bigger and less equal. Pro-poor rural growth then increasingly requires policies that raise and 
diversify demand for employment-intensive agricultural commodities, underpin rural off-farm 
opportunities for farmers, and allow successful migration.  
 
Less clear is how these policy options play out at regional level in countries, such as India and 
China, with high and rising intra-rural inequality among regions. As a rule, policy for advanced 
regions should facilitate the ongoing shift towards rural non-farm employment and urbanisation. 
But should that also apply in poor regions, or should policy and public-sector activity there 
facilitate  mainly  agricultural  take-off,  as  is  appropriate  in  comparably  poor  countries?  We 
review the options in sec. 4e-f. Increasingly, China’s fight against poverty depends on growth 
that is regionally pro-poor and pulls poor people out of spatial poverty traps. Economic growth, 
but also its structure and nature, together determine how much the poor can be benefit. 
 
Since the late 1970s, core liberalisation was the main theme of market-oriented reform. It laid 
the basis for China’s economic growth (Ch. 1). In principle, that should bring more market 
opportunities for all people, including the poor, so they can use enlarged markets to maximise 
their income. However, the government also implemented other policies. These can improve, 
worsen, distort, or even reverse the impact of core liberalisation on poorer areas or groups 
(Chapter 3). 
 
Policy  options  in  2000-15  for  poverty  reduction  and  personal  and  regional  equality,  in  the 
context of rural and agricultural development, fall into two groups, corresponding roughly to 
policies affecting rates or structure of growth and participation in growth [Stern et al. 2005]. 
Market-opening policies (sec. 4c) further liberalise the economy, and are likely to accelerate 
growth. Such policies can allow more poor people and remote rural areas to use wider markets 
to  increase  their  income,  but  the  strength  of  this  effect  depends  substantially  on  market-
supplementing policies (secs. 4d-h). These either compensate net losers from liberalisation, or 
improve provision of public, semi-public, merit or infrastructural goods so as to increase market 
access or market gains for poor persons or regions, and enterprises employing or otherwise 
benefiting them, during liberalisation. 
 
(c) Pro-poor options for further liberalisation 
 
Some  artificial  incentives  harm  ‘core  liberalisation’  and  hence  economic  efficiency,  and 
equality among provinces and persons. Policies to spread gains and losses more evenly – e.g. to 
phase out concessions and incentives to invest in already booming coastal and urban areas – are 
win-win. 
 
                                                 
55Ravallion and Chen 2004 for China; Ravallion and Chen 1999 and Palmer-Jones and Sen 2003, for India; for 
overviews, Byerlee et al. 2005; Eastwood and Lipton 2000.    24 
Second, also win-win is the (apparently ongoing) policy option of raising, through taxes bearing 
equally on all sources of rural income, revenue currently from agriculture-specific taxes and 
fees. This can be revenue-neutral, neither shrinking nor swelling the State. Since both poor 
households and poor provinces derive larger shares of income than do the non-poor from farms, 




Third, experimental relaxation of hukou in some better-off counties has, in some cases, led to 
some extra migration (sec. 4 (c) (ii)). A liberalising policy option, redistributing benefits of 
migration to poorer people and areas, is to give priority in relaxing these restrictions to residents 
in  West-Central  provinces,  making  rural  out-migration  safer.  This  would  increase  local 
resources  for  remaining  West-Central  rural  residents;  increase  their  remittance  inflow  from 
towns; and, by shifting labour supply from West-Central villages to towns, cut the rural-urban 
gap in the provinces where it is largest (Figure 11). A similar, and apparently strongly indicated, 
pro-poor liberalising policy option would be to extend, throughout these provinces, permission 
for rental of household land by migrants,
57 removing the risk that land is lost to the household 
(returned  to  the  community)  during  migration,  and  making  it  more  feasible  for  poorer 
households  and  provinces.  Several  papers  in  (Bhattasali  et  al.  2005)  quantify  how  hukou 
removal can improve the impact of WTO and internal liberalisation on China’s poor people and 
regions. 
    
However, uneducated and ill-informed poor people may gain less from better market incentives. 
They often live in regions where geography and technology mean low responsiveness of output 
to price. Nor can such people afford, without support, education and information to further local 
innovation or effective migration. Also, ‘successful’ free-market incentives may have bad side-
effects on some of the poor. For example, markets are now sufficiently well integrated that 
easier imports of land-intensive crops can drive remote farmers out of cash crops (Huang et al. 
2005). 
    
Core  liberalisation  (Chapter  1)  includes  freer  markets  in  goods  and  services,  factors,  and 
investment, both internationally and internationally; phasing-out of non-market influences on 
prices for competitive commodities; and clarification of property rights. This section considers 
policy options to free up four areas: international trade and capital inflows; movement of labour; 
fuller land rights; and market entry. How will such options affect rural poverty and inequality? 
What policy options can improve these effects? 
 
(i) Freer international trade and FDI inflow: China’s foreign trade surged as a result of both 
trade liberalisation and openness to (largely export-orientated) FDI. As standard theory predicts, 
this  shifted  demand  towards  China’s  relatively  abundant  factor,  labour.  That  happened  in 
agriculture  (Fig.  5).  To  that  extent,  more  and  freer  trade  proved  pro-poor.  On  reasonable 
assumptions, farmers in all income-groups benefited on average from liberalisation (Huang, 
Rozelle  and  Zhang  2004).  However,  WTO  entry  may  in  2001-7  very  slightly  cut  average 
income of the poor. This is short-term and reversible (e.g. by easier migration), but effects on 
local groups of households, e.g. in NE China, may be more (Chen and Ravallion 2005). What 
policy options can improve these impacts on the poor? 
 
First, with current technology, some regions are ‘stuck’ in land-intensive products, in which 
they have comparative advantage (Huang et al. 2005). In some poor inland areas in western 
China, where land-intensive agriculture is the main activity, farm households, as producers, may 
lose  from  more  or  freer  trade.  New  policy  options  can  help  them  to  shift  their  production 
decisions  (where  appropriate)  towards  more  competitive  agricultural  products.  In  particular, 
                                                 
56See table 6. To the extent that such charges are shifted forwards to food buyers, this too is regressive; poorer people 
and regions devote larger proportions of income to food. 
57This has been done by some counties in richer provinces on an experimental basis.    25 
policy shifts in agricultural research and water control can involve, or stimulate, investments in 
land-augmenting  technical  progress.  Where  such  approaches  are  uneconomic  or  infeasible, 
government  can  facilitate  migration  out  of  remote  and  resource-scarce  regions,  helping 
households to escape areas of durably uncompetitive agricultural production. 
  
Second,  labour-intensive  (and  hence  pro-poor)  trade  expansion  assumes  that  China’s  trade 
partners,  especially  OECD  countries,  will  to  accept  China’s  exports  as  agreed.  As  recent 
disagreements  between  China and  the  EU  and the USA  suggest,  that is  far from  reality in 
agriculture, textiles, etc. How can the Government of China persuade trading partners to honour 
their own promises, explicit or implicit, of liberalisation, made when China joined the WTO? 
One promising policy option is to respond to (partly valid) concerns that rapid Chinese export 
expansion  may  harm  many  other,  even  poorer  developing  countries  such  as  Bangladesh 
(textiles) or Kenya (horticulture). Perhaps, on the understanding of OECD-wide commitment to 
faster  implementation  of  WTO  principles  on  market  access,  China  might  offer  increased 
assistance to such countries in increasing their agricultural productivity, poverty-orientation, and 
readiness  for  liberalisation.  Such  development  co-operation  would  build  on  China’s  great 
achievements in these areas, and would accord with stated Chinese policy of ‘Peaceful Rise’ and 
‘Co-prosperity’. 
 
Third, international trade and FDI tended to cluster on coastal regions, and the benefits of them 
concentrated mainly in seaboard provinces. Though the prosperity in coastal regions relative to 
interior  regions  indeed  reflects  the  geographic  locations  and  corresponding  comparative 
advantages, government’s preferential policies toward coastal regions also added a lot to the 
economic divide between the coastal and interior (ch. 1, sec. c; ch. 2, sec. c). Furthermore, to 
attract FDI, local leaders usually promised preferential policies – even sometimes a fixed rate of 
return  –  to  FDI.  Such  policies  –  apart  from  being  against  liberalisation,  and  widening  the 
coastal-interior income gap – widened sectoral imbalance
58 to the disadvantage of the working 
poor,  and  facilitated  severe  corruption.  Since  the  late  1990s,  the  government  has  pursued 
strategies  to  address  regional  imbalance,  e.g.  Western  China’s  Regional  Development  Plan 
(Xibu Da Kaifa) and the creation of a free trade zone with ASEAN.
59 Further policy options 
could improve poorer interior provinces’ chance to raise employment-creating investment (not 
just manufacturing FDI):  
•  Raising the proportion of public infrastructural investment (electricity, water, roads, etc.) 
going to interior provinces, apart from raising economic returns on such investment (Fan et 
al. 2002; Fan and Chan-Kang 2005), would cut the high transaction-costs that now harm 
‘interior’ enterprises when seeking investment or engaging in international trade. 
•  Giving domestic investment ‘national treatment’, so that it and FDI are treated equally, will 
reduce bias against interior areas with above-average ratios of domestic investment to FDI. 
•  Phasing out super-national preferential treatment for export sectors and manufacturing, and 
treating all sectors and investment sources similarly, will allow the labour-intensive service 
sector  to  develop  proportionately.  Continuing  artificial  export  stimuli  impede  efficiency 
(e.g. by steering FDI away from producing for the home market); run against the spirit of 
WTO; and discourage location of economic activity away from the ports, in the poorer 
interior. This is also damaged because the stimuli discourage production for local markets. 
Gradually, as it becomes feasible politically, the Government may phase out such artificial 
stimuli. But this may be delayed by resistance from powerful localities (and enterprises) 
benefiting from the stimuli. Meanwhile, a more rapid remedy is available: to estimate the 
costs of export stimuli to provinces losing from them, and to compensate losers – or the 
poor among them – by appropriate cash transfers, or tax allowances, for interior provinces. 
                                                 
58By favouring manufacturing against more labour-intensive service sectors.  
59Geographically, Southwestern and Northwestern provinces of China locate nearest to these countries.   26 
•  Stimulating the rural non-farm sector in remote, less developed regions by better financial 
services (ch. 4, sec. g)
60 and priority for cuts in local, provincial and national taxes or fees; 
RNFS activity (usually mainly in services) provides much employment for the poor.  
 
Fourth, though China’s exports tend to be labour-intensive, Wood (1994) shows that a minimum 
level of ‘base-ed’ is needed to benefit substantially from manufacturing exports in the wake of 
liberalisation. The high salience of manufactured exports in China’s liberalisation and growth 
implies that, for remote rural regions (especially the West (Table 5)) to participate, spreading 
base-ed there is crucial, and will help workers to avoid loss – and seek gain – in face of variable 
market conditions. Therefore – despite the ‘double burden’ (ch. 4, sec. h), which also requires 
huge investment in professional education and training – the Government may seek to swiftly 
meet its pledge to 9-year free, compulsory rural primary education.  
 
(ii)  Freer  Labour Mobility:  International experience suggests that rural labour  migration is 
central  both  to  income  growth  and  to  its  distribution,  and  therefore  to  overall  poverty  and 
inequality.  In  rural  societies  before  rapid  economic  growth,  the  great  mass  of  rural  labour 
migration is to other rural areas, and is seasonal (to take advantage of different labour peaks 
among farming areas). Such migration remains important in poorer areas, but with development 
rural-urban migration rose sharply, and is now over half total migration (Chan and Hu 2003; on 
data see Cai and Wang 2003). Since 2000, government has issued a series of documents aimed 
at loosening or eliminating restrictions on rural-urban labour migration (Song 2002). Despite 
great progress, many restrictions still remain. First, hukou remains stubborn, and still regulates 
and deters labour migration. Especially in China’s large and medium cities, rural employees are 
unlikely to get the status of lawful residents. Second, compared with their urban counterparts, 
rural labourers are discriminated against by many regulations on types of work and sector they 
can enter, minimum required education, etc.
61 Third, in most regions rural employees cannot 
enjoy  the  same  treatment  of  social  security,  health  care,  and  children  education  as  urban 
residents.  More  importantly,  even  in  areas  where  local  authorities
62 have  pledged  not  to 
implement abandoned restrictions, potential rural migrants are deterred by doubts about the 
credibility of the pledge, tighter one-child controls in towns, and, most important, the weak 
business environment and few off-farm jobs in those areas. 
 
In order to facilitate rural labour mobility, the following policy options suggest themselves. In 
some cases, gradual implementation may be indicated, but the preferred goal appears to be to 
abolish, or work towards gradual elimination of, hukou system and all related discriminatory 
policies. This will be politically contentious, and will need attention to social stability, but if the 
central  government  agrees  that  hukou  harms  the  economy  and  especially  poor  would-be 
migrants, it should liberalise this, so far, most stubborn planning-style system. A policy option 
to  render  hukou  abolition  politically  sustainable,  and  to  improve  the  prospects  of  desirable 
equalizing and poverty-reducing effects, might be a three-track policy.  
• First, increased rural and nearby small-town opportunities – mainly in farming in some remote 
areas, mainly outside it elsewhere – are preferred by rural people to distant migration, even if 
expected income gain is rather less (Zhao 1999).  Policies to raise such local employment 
growth  may  be  indicated  if  hukou  abolition  is  not  to  produce  a  surge  of  urbanisation. 
‘Reducing the rural-urban income gap may be a powerful policy instrument to control the 
pace of migration and urbanisation’ (Zhang and Song 2003). 
• Second, appropriate measures could spread migration information, access, and benefits more 
evenly towards remote rural regions, minority groups,
63 the under-educated, and lower income 
                                                 
60In India, denser financial networks lead to higher district-level RNFS activity (Binswanger and Khandker 1995: 
234-62). 
61In some regions rural labourers cannot be employed in banking, security or driving. In Beijing, rural labourers from 
outside the region must have completed junior secondary education – excluding the 89 percent who have no more 
than primary schooling. 
62Most of them are medium and small counties with population less than 50, 000. 
63In China, minorities are less likely to migrate (Huang and Pieke 2003)    27 
strata. In several countries in Latin America (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1992), the income 
disadvantages of minority groups are attributable largely to low education and lack of fluency 
in the majority language; when these are remedied, the income gap also closes. Access to 
better migration options explains much of this process, which is universal, not special to Latin 
America.  
• Third, just as India seeks an ‘exit policy’- training and resettlement – to make privatisation of 
state-owned  companies  tolerable  to  the  many  now  privileged,  but  potentially  poor,  urban 
workers who face retrenchment, so China may need to ‘compensate’ similarly placed urban-
born workers who would lose privileges from hukou abolition. One policy option would be to 
confine any ‘compensation’ (for loss of unearned and socially harmful privileges) to low-
income groups, and to offer it in the form of retraining or resettlement, not long-term cash.  
 
Hukou  reform  is  strongly  indicated  to  increase  poor  people’s  earning  opportunity  from 
migration, and will work better if they are equipped to seize that opportunity through other 
reforms: 
(1)  Higher  investment  in  professional  training  –  and  in  basic  education  –  are  increasingly 
important in enabling rural people to work off-farm. In the 1980s, each extra year of education 
raised the probability of becoming a migrant by 10 percent, and the probability of working in a 
local wage-earning job by 6 percent.  By the 1990s, the effects had risen, to 18 percent and 17 
percent respectively (Huang et al. 2004).  
 (2) Support and facilitation of the local business environment, as well as the regulatory regime, 
affects rural workers’ chance to find off-farm jobs. Faster licensing for self-employed business, 
and varying the existing tax system with lower licence fees (and possibly lower taxes) for small 
and  medium  enterprises  –  which  are  generally  more  employment-intensive  –  would  help 
migrants find work more quickly. 
(3) What are the priority areas for liberalising labour mobility? To help the most migrants, 
priority should go to the central provinces, the source of most rural labour migration. On latest 
MOA estimates, in 2003 Henan, a central province, alone provided 70-80 million of a total of 
200 million migrants. However, to help the poor to escape poverty through migration, priority 
for mobility liberalisation should go to the NW and SW provinces. Their rural populations are 
now less prone to migrate, due to remoteness, transport, lower labour education (Table 5), and 
perhaps ethnic group – but also to more restricted mobility. 
(4)  Expanded  urban  social  provision  and  infrastructure  are  needed,  to  accommodate  future 
cityward migration (transportation, housing, schools, expanded healthcare systems). 
 
(iii) Land markets: China’s household responsibility system provides each rural household with 
rights to usufruct for 30 years (extended in 1998), from a farm area, standardised for quality, 
proportionate to household size. So China provides each rural family with a basic minimum of 
farmland resources. However, these resources have been falling with population growth, land-
water degradation, and alienation of farmland for urban uses; the average holding is now about 
0.5ha and falling. In some advanced provinces, emigration and rising local wage-rates have led 
to upward pressure on farm size and inequality.  
 
Usufruct  rights  provide  incentives  to  produce  and  to  buy  improved  seeds  and  nitrogenous 
fertilisers. However, short leases – and the high risk that local authorities may reallocate land to 
allow for changes in household size, or for the needs of factories or towns – have worrying 
consequences.  First,  the  farmer’s  incentive  to  spend  for  land  conservation  or  long-run 
improvement – via a well, trees, or even phosphatic fertiliser – is reduced. Second, flexibility is 
reduced: farm families who wish to migrate for a year or two cannot rent or sell land and get it 
back on return. Third, security is reduced, because land cannot be relied upon for collateral or 
sale in time of need. These side-effects are especially serious for poor people in poor areas, 
since their non-farm alternatives are fewer. Some experiments to lengthen leases, free up land 
markets, and reduce the community’s power to change farm size are under way, but they are 
difficult to generalize. They may well raise income, but largely (and most visibly) for the better-
off  (land  developers).  Adding  to  the  political  difficulty,  conflicts  about  land are  fiercest  in   28 
advanced regions, due to high land rents and values. It may be in the interests of the poor to 
concentrate policies to increase land security, and transfer rights to households, on remote areas, 
though long leases (50 years) might be preferred so that the risk of land inequality is reduced. A 
further policy option is to pilot incentives, to local authorities and to private households, to rent 
land to poorer people. 
 
Some land-rights regulation is needed. Authorities (as decentralised as feasible) can, in almost 
all countries and politico-economic systems, reasonably legislate (a) to ensure that even farmers 
in legitimate control of land or water do not, without negotiation or legal procedures and full 
compensation, damage their neighbours’ private or commons rights, (b) to zone some land as 
unsuitable for some uses (e.g. flood irrigation that endangers housing areas), (c) to keep – for 
defined emergencies (to prevent disaster or serious environmental damage, or to meet socially 
recognised and severe need that cannot be addressed otherwise) – ‘eminent domain’ rights to 
take over land, in the last resort by compulsion, but only with full compensation and after due 
legal process. This is fully compatible with the deregulations proposed above. 
 
(iv) Freer sector entry in urban areas: Despite huge development of non-state sectors, they still 
cannot  compete  freely  against  big  SOEs.  Many  business  fields  are  labelled  ‘strategic’  (e.g. 
communications,  post  office,  aviation,  electricity,  etc.)  and  put  off-limits  to  non-state 
enterprises,  especially  private  enterprises.
64 Such  discriminatory  polices  severely  reduce  the 
employment impact of economic growth, because non-state enterprises are relatively labour-
intensive in technical choice. Liberalising non-state enterprises’ entry to these so-called strategic 
sectors should benefit economic growth and job provision.
65.  
 
(d) Addressing inequality: sector options to complement core liberalisation and growth 
 
China probably cannot ‘maintain its past rate of progress against poverty without addressing the 
problem of rising inequality’ (Ravallion and Chen 2004: 37).
66 Why? 
 
(i) Slower growth possible: China has apparently sustained to 2005 its 1980-2001 GDP-per-
head growth of 8.2 percent per year. Analysts differ on future growth, but anti-poverty policy 
has to allow for the possibility that GDP, and even more so consumption, will rise more slowly. 
•  This 8.2% rate may be much overstated,
67 though nobody questions that growth was 
high. 
•  Surveyed mean per-person rural consumption – a better measure than mean GDP of 
welfare for those at risk of poverty – grew more slowly (3.36%/year: Ravallion and 
Chen 2004). 
•  Of recent GDP growth in China and elsewhere in East Asia, about one-third depended 
on falls in the dependant/worker ratio (Bloom and Williamson 1998); in China, these 
falls are now coming to an end.  
                                                 
64Also, since most non-state enterprises are medium or small, they find it hard to borrow from banks, due to lack of 
collateral. 
65In some sectors, regulatory issues involving safety issues, externalities, nationwide servicing, and scale economies 
leading to local monopoly would need to be addressed after private-sector entry. However, this is not an excuse for 
stopping such entry, since similar issues arise for state enterprise activity also. 
66This has been true, even in the 1990s, of other large Asian countries such as India or Indonesia. ‘As more and more 
people are no longer labeled as the poor, it becomes more difficult to pull the remainder out of the poverty trap…in 
2003 the headcount of the poor increased by 800,000 despite…growth (of) 9.1 percent …Future efforts to reduce 
rural  poverty  cannot  rely  primarily  on  general  economic  growth…  it  is  not  easy  to  maintain  (growth  at)  8 
percent…the performance of poverty reduction depends on the quality of growth, especially the status of income 
distribution….(Though) growth was the most important (correlate of) fall of poverty incidence (in 1980-2002), as 
income attain(ed)  a certain level, the contribution of income growth to poverty reduction become relatively less. 
From 1995 to 2002, the per capita GDP grew by 63 percent, only account(ing) for 77 percent of the reduction of 
poverty incidence rate’ (Huang et al. 2005a). 
67‘Systematic understatement of inflation by enterprises accounts for 2.5% growth per annum in the non-agricultural 
economy (in) 1978-98’ (Young 2000). On overstatement of agricultural growth, see ch. 4, sec. e (iii), fn. 75 (on 
Jiangsu).   29 
•  Problems of SOEs surviving only by – and banks at risk due to – non-performing loans, 
and efforts at bank reforms and SOE layoffs, have emerged since the mid-1990s without 
slowing economic growth. However, some argue that solvency of some SOEs and banks 
requires changing ‘laws that put the interests of workers, not creditors, first’ (McGibbin 
and Stoeckel 2004). If indeed required, this would slow growth – and, without other 
measures, would also increase short-term poverty and inequality at given GDP per head. 
 
(ii)  Growth  reduces  poverty,  but  in  China  the  transmission  has  weakened:  Growth  is 
increasingly  concentrated  in  mainly  urban  ‘growth  foci’  in  richer  provinces;  and  inequality 
within  poorer  rural  regions  has  been  big  and  increasing.  So,  in  most  areas  with  low  mean 
income  in  1990,  growth  below  the  national  average  has  limited  investible  resources,  while 
higher and faster-rising inequality has widened gaps between elites and others.  
 
Both  trends  (a)  have  probably  increased  weaknesses,  in  poorer  areas,  of  governance  and 
participation as instruments for mass poverty reduction; counties with greater fiscal dependence 
(more per-person net fiscal inflows from higher-level jurisdictions) tend to have lower per-
person  agricultural  and  industrial  output,  largely  because  more  government  personnel  are 
required  to  provide  a  given  level  of  support  services,
68 (b)  reinforcing  that,  have  increased 
emigration,  to  towns  in  faster-growing  provinces,  of  educated  potential  rural  leaders  and 
motivators of participant groups. Further, poor regions, especially their poorer households, have 
higher fertility and dependency, less education, and less non-farm diversification (Table 5; on 
India,  see  Dyson  et  al.  2004).  So,  partly  because  of  the  success  of  better-off  areas,  rising 
proportions of the poor live in poorer provinces, where all sources of mass poverty reduction 
(agriculture, rural non-farm growth, migrant remittances) offer special difficulty. What policy 
options can remedy this? 
 
(iii) Safety-nets without redistribution? ‘Social provision’ of transfers, in cash or kind, includes 
universal  ‘social  insurance’  and  non-contributory  ‘social  assistance’  targeted  at  the  poor 
uninsured. Either can provide short-term relief in emergencies (including natural disasters), or 
long-term help for children, the old, the involuntarily unemployed and the ill. Such provision 
not only alleviates distress, but also increases security, and therefore preparedness to take risks 
in search of higher profits, wages or output during liberalisation. Even with very low mean 
GDP, China, with a handful of other countries, led the world in providing such transfers, even at 
low  levels  of  mean  income.  However,  the  move  to  market  incentives  –  essential  for  rapid 
growth – has been allowed to undermine such provision. Informal, unregistered, largely rural-to-
urban labour  migrants  (variously  estimated  at  70-120  million) enjoy  almost  no  access. The 
shrinking State share of GDP has also reduced free rural health and education access.  
 
In principle, policy options exist for helping the poor during slower growth or recession without 
reducing  inequality.
69  Liberalisation  is  consistent  with  tax-  or  insurance-financed,  non-
redistributive  unemployment  and  health  insurance,  adjustment  assistance,  retraining, 
resettlement grants for workers retrenched from SOEs, and other safety nets. However, such 
measures – except for rural public works – seldom reach informal, rural and remote workers 
who lose employment or income because of bad harvests or demand contraction. The measures 
need most public money during fiscal squeezes, when taxes are hard to raise and expenditures 
already under pressure.
70 And China’s scarce resources for social protection and insurance must 
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69Cook (2002) argues that ‘(although g)roups formerly excluded from the security of the ‘iron rice bowl’ (public-
sector  jobs  for  life  or  equivalent  basic-needs  guarantees)    are  now  excluded  from  new  forms  of  social 
assistance…new  safety-net  measures,  both  to  assist  the  most  vulnerable…and  to  enhance  their  longer-term 
security…can be effective (,but) only alongside a complementary set of social protection policies including increased 
investment in human resources. Better-designed interventions could strengthen…informal safety nets, and allow an 
expanded role for non-governmental organisations.’ 
70 This paper does not review policy options for social assistance, pensions or social insurance. We concentrate on 
efforts to reduce poverty and inequality by measures directed at the productivity of the poor.    30 
focus on the fast-growing population of old, and hence also often ill, non-workers. To tackle 
other  widespread  deprivation  during  market  opening,  how can  productivity  growth (without 
being retarded) be redistributed towards poorer, slower-improving rural households and areas? 
 
(iv)  Redistributing  sources  of  growth:  ‘Business as usual’ – completing core liberalisation, 
reversing  ‘non-core  liberalisations’  that  proved  mistaken,  adding  feasible  safety-nets  –  will 
probably not make major inroads on residual mass poverty and associated regional disparity, nor 
maintain consensus for further core liberalisation (e.g. of land and labour markets) if – even 
while, overall, pro-growth and pro-poor – it hurts many vulnerable people and regions. China 
already has one of the highest levels of overall inequality in Asia and ‘aggregate growth is 
increasingly coming from sources that bring limited gains to the poorest’ (Ravallion and Chen 
2004: 37). To accelerate poverty reduction, and to avoid risks of disaffection in remote areas and 
among minority groups, it seems advisable to select policy options for orderly and consensual 
redistribution of access to the sources of growth, In China’s cities and coastal provinces, there is 
an outstanding record of participation by poor people in growth. In the poverty crescent too, 
more investment in their health and education is not only of value per se, but also as a source of 
such participation, and thus for maintaining a national consensus on liberalisation for ‘growth 
with justice’.   
 
China enjoys some advantages for such policies. First, past growth means that there are fewer 
poor people left, and more resources to help them with. Second – due to past diminishing 
returns in advanced areas, and also to new knowledge about poorer areas – the redirection of 
some extra public investment, at the margin, from richer to poorer areas can improve growth as 
well as income distribution. Care is needed, however. For example, an extra million yuan on 
rural roads brings more poverty reduction and more growth if spent in poor South-western 
provinces than in the East, but in North-western provinces there is a trade-off: the extra road 
investment brings more poverty reduction than in the East, but less growth. And road spending 
needs also to be informed by evidence: the same money can ‘buy’ more poverty-reduction and 
more growth if spent on rural roads rather than urban, and on more miles of low-quality roads 
rather than fewer miles of high-quality roads (Fan and Chan-Kang 2005). Extra agricultural 
research,  too,  in  some  poor  areas  now  contributes  much  more  to  both  growth  and  poverty 
reduction than in some better-off areas (Fan et al. 2003) but care is needed in selection of both 
areas  and  technologies,  so  as  to  avoid  waste,  unwelcome  growth-poverty  trade-offs,  and 
environmental dangers. 
 
(v) Sector-specific policy options: We close by reviewing: 
•  Policy options affecting the types of activity by which individuals seek improvement 
through production: agriculture and the rural non-farm sector (4e-f);
71 
•  Social policies for rural financial services, education and health (including nutrition), 
and hence demographic circumstances, of poor rural people and areas (4g-h).  
We review the policy options in the context of China’s drive to freer markets. Sometimes, 
public-sector  provision  or  subsidisation,  of  inputs  or  services  is  the  best  way  forward. 
Sometimes, easing the paths for private action may work better.
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(e) Framework for pro-poor agricultural growth during liberalisation 
 
(i) Is agricultural growth still crucial to cut poverty and inequality? 51 percent of China’s 
workers in 2001 (down from 71 percent in 1981) reported agriculture as their largest source of 
income  (Huang  and  Rozelle  2005).  However,  much  larger  proportions  of  income  and 
employment come from agriculture in the West-Central poverty crescent, especially for poorer 
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72In  1988-93,  counties  around  cities  with  more  ‘openness  in  trade...demonstrate  a  greater  decline  in urban-rural 
income inequality’ (Wei and Wu 2001). But, especially with partial internal liberalization (integration), losses for the 
poorest people and regions cannot be ruled out, theoretically or empirically (Venables 2005).   31 
households (Table 5). These provinces still depend mainly on slowly changing, often unirrigated 
farming. Meanwhile, China’s advanced provinces, after transforming their agricultures, have 
become mainly non-agricultural; most of their rural growth and poverty reduction will continue 
to come from non-farm growth and migration. Can the West-Central rural poverty crescent 
‘jump a stage’, cutting rural poverty and inequality through non-farm and urban take-off without 
agricultural transformation? If a province can quantify a ‘non-agriculture-led’ strategy that is 
sufficiently  employment-intensive  to  slash  poverty  alongside  rapid  growth,  in  a  liberalising 
context and with ‘affordable’ physical and human capital, that is a policy option. But it may not 
often be promising. Successful rural non-farm growth usually comes after, and in response to, 
rapid growth of demand out of local farm incomes (Bell, Hazell and Slade 1982; Hazell and 
Ramasamy 1991; Lipton 2005). As for migrant remittances, in many areas the West-Central 
rural poor over-represent educational and ethnic groups associated with low or unsuccessful 
migration. Further, the agricultural option is promising. Advanced provinces are moving out of 
agriculture,  and  irrigation  there  will  become  less  subsidised  and  less  affordable  for  staples 
production. Agricultural research, roads and irrigation show diminishing returns in the East, and 
often higher returns in the NW and SW. In most of these poorer areas, the most credible policy 
option  to  slash  poverty  and  inequality  is  probably  to  go  for  accelerated  farm  productivity 
growth.
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(ii) Initial conditions for further agricultural growth, and policy options: In this effort, China 
starts with one big advantage, land equality; one advantage that may be less than it seems, 
demonstrated past capacity to induce rapid farm growth; and some problems.  
•  Economically,  trade  and  FDI  liberalisation  helps  poor  consumers,  and  producers  of 
labour-intensives. It harms – unless they can switch crops or occupations – producers of land-
intensive crops. These are grown mainly in poor remote provinces, and are disadvantaged by 
transport costs (high weight/value ratios, distance from ports) and land-intensity. In 1985-97, 
China’s trade balance in labour-intensive farm products improved from about $1.7 bn to $4.8 
bn, while in land-intensives the balance worsened from $0.9 bn to minus $4.0 bn (Rozelle 
2004).  
•   Internally,  China’s  increasing  water  shortage,  and  the  ongoing  and  sure  (if  slow) 
liberalisation of water markets, presage sharp regional changes in the product-mix. Advanced 
irrigated areas will massively shift workers and land out of agriculture, and farm water – as 
both subsidies and water-tables sink – from rice to high-value crops. This will make space to 
attack  poverty  in  the  West-Central  crescent  by  intensifying  unirrigated  staples,  spreading 
irrigation where appropriate, and introducing appropriate cash crops.  
•  Technically, therefore – while China is a world leader in agricultural sciences – an 
important policy option is to focus agricultural and hydrological research much more on (a) 
requirements  of  poor households  in  poor,  and often  semi-arid,  areas, (b) innovations that 
increase  the  competitiveness,  robustness  to  moisture  stress,  and  labour-intensity  of  their 
mainly  land-intensive,  unirrigated  exports  and  import  substitutes.  Main  research  outputs 
should  include  new  transgenic  and  other  crop  varieties,  and  techniques  (not  just  social 
choices) to improve water control, use-efficiency and robustness. Steering such research to 
poorer agro-ecologies often increases returns and poverty impact (Fan et al. 2000). 
•  Structurally, two issues are striking in Chinese agriculture.  
(a) Land structure: Like almost all of Asia and Africa, China since the 1970s has seen 
steady falls in both median farm size and size of farm containing the ‘median hectare’ The 
only  convincing  explanation  is  that  while  labour  remains  the  main  productive  factor, 
smaller farms – probably due to easier labour supervision – are more attractive to farm 
(Lipton  2005a).  However,  in  advanced  regions,  falling  availability  of farm  labour,  and 
                                                 
73In most developing countries, reducing the inequality of farmland may substantially cut poverty, even without faster 
agricultural growth. In China, farmland is already very equal, so this option does not arise. However, evidence from 
elsewhere suggests that significantly higher farmland inequality, especially in regions where mass poverty persists, 
would retard farm employment and poverty reduction, without increasing farm efficiency (IFAD 2001).    32 
readier access to capital, are inducing a shift to larger farms. In both cases, a policy option 
is to free land rental markets (Deininger and Jin 2002).  
(b)  Workforce  structure:  in  1990-2000,  women  over  30  came  to  predominate  in  the 
agricultural workforce, especially in poor areas. There, the proportion of women aged 31-
50 in agriculture fell from over 95 percent to over 85 percent, but the proportion of men in 
these age groups collapsed, from 70 percent to below 40 percent (Rozelle 2004). Policy 
options to support gender equality in control of land, livestock, information and market 
access may be required. 
•  Fiscally, though ‘total tax on rural households (both formal taxation and informal fee 
charges) increased only by 1 to 4 percent of the rural net income from 1986 to 1999’, the 
burden shifted sharply to poorer households and areas, staying at 10.5 percent of total net 
income for the poorest rural households (annual per capita income less than 200 yuan) but 
falling from 9.5 percent to 4.4 percent for the richest (above 8000 yuan) (Tao and Liu 2004).  
That is because the great bulk of rural taxes falls on agriculture (which provides a much larger 
share  of  work  time,  and hence income,  for  poor  households and regions than  for others: 
Tables  5-6),  not  on  non-farm  income  (which  grew  fastest  for  better-off  households  and 
provinces).  One  policy  option,  revenue-neutral  shifts  from  agricultural  taxes  and  fees  to 
income tax, would cut market distortions and shift income to poorer regions and households.
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Premier  Wen  Jiabao  announced  in  June  2005  that  ‘China  will  exempt  farmers  from 
agricultural taxes in 2006, two years ahead of schedule’ (Xing Qinjiao 2005 and 2004). For 
this to work, implementation must not be impeded, nor its effect reversed, by provincial- or 
county-level fee or tax increases on agriculture as in the past (Tao and Liu 2004).  
 
(iii)  Agricultural  technology  and  investment  and  the  poverty  crescent:  After  the first  two 
decades  of  the  green  revolution,  it  has  everywhere  shifted  emphasis  from  raising  yields  to 
defending  them  in  face  of  new  pest  biotypes, increasing  water  shortages  and  micronutrient 
exhaustion.  Hence  yield  growth  has  declined  for  main  crops  in  China  (Rozelle  2004),  as 
elsewhere in Asia. Even recent agricultural growth may have been overstated.
75 It is further 
threatened  by  the  global  slowdown  of  yield  growth  from  conventional  plant  breeding 
(IFAD2001).  
 
Labour productivity must grow if farming is to stay attractive – and, with hardly any ‘spare’ 
cultivable land,
76 yield has to grow faster than labour productivity, to avoid net employment loss 
in  agriculture  (and  downward  pressure  on  wage-rates  elsewhere,  making  poverty  reduction 
harder). Technology also needs to raise crop-per-drop. Despite some reforms, irrigation remains 
widely  and  substantially  subsidised.  This  induces  water  over-use  that  is  unsustainable  both 
ecologically  (falling  water-tables,
77  salinity)  and  economically  (efficiency  costs,  plus  the 
inequity of farm water overuse while domestic users, especially poor ones, clamour for clean 
water  at  the  market  price).  On  top  of  this,  evapotranspiration  rates  may  rise  with  global 
warming. Despite these dwindling sources of growth – land, water, labour, conventional plant 
breeding – IFPRI’s projections suggest that China’s agricultural supply will stay roughly in 
balance with growing demand at least to 2015-20. What policy options exist to improve on this, 
to reduce excessive land, water and environmental costs, and to steer benefits towards poorer 
people and regions? 
 
Higher public investment in infrastructure for agriculture, and its relocation in promising areas 
within the poverty provinces, are crucial. ‘Simulations …suggest that a 5 percent increase in 
                                                 
74Also because poorer households use larger proportions of income to buy food.  
75For one province, Jiangsu, aggregate data show annual productivity growth at 5.8 percent for 1988-96, as against 
0.1 percent in careful household surveys. The smaller figure appears to reflect reduced investment in the 1980s and 
fuller accounting of input cost increases (Carter et al. 1999). See also Ao and Fulginiti (2003). 
76China has hardly any unused potential farmland. Salinity and urbanisation reduce farmland almost every year.   
77A special problem faces N and NE China, with ‘over 40% of the population and nearly 60% of the cultivated land, 
but only around 15% of total water resources(;) in the North China Plain, the water level in the deep aquifer is falling 
every year, making extraction more costly’ (New Agriculturist 2002).     33 
government investment in agriculture would make China a net exporter of 31 million tons of 
cereal by 2020’ (New Agriculturist 2002), with employment gains accordingly. Key forms of 
public  investment    –  irrigation,  agricultural  research,  roads,  schools  –  not  only  bring  more 
people out of poverty, but add more to GDP (largely from agriculture) if located in some remote 
rural areas, rather than in the traditional ‘lead areas’ where diminishing returns have set in. 
However, both the areas and the forms of investment (e.g. low-quality rural roads, appropriate 
plant-breeding)  must  be  carefully  selected  to  secure  these  returns  (Fan  et  al.  (2000,  2002). 
Overall, for China (like India and Indonesia), past growth in agriculture has been much more 
effective at reducing poverty, rural and urban, than similar growth in other sectors (Chen and 
Ravallion 2004).  
 
In these circumstances, public investment in agricultural infrastructures in remote areas is 
a powerful policy choice. There could not be credible objections in the WTO, given the ‘green 
box’, the prevalence of (much less pro-poor and more distortive) OECD farm support, and the 
adherence of almost all WTO members to the Millennium Development anti-poverty goal. It 
would, however, be desirable that any large expansion of public investment did not greatly bias 
the within-agriculture product-mix. 
 
This is especially so because market-responsive changes in that product-mix, as in India and 
several  other  countries,  are  a  likely  and  desirable  response  to  economic  and environmental 
change,  and  will  probably  themselves  be  pro-poor.  It  will  be  increasingly  uneconomic  and 
environmentally problematic to grow thirsty, low-value crops such as rice in advanced, irrigated 
areas of China (or India, Mexico, etc.). That is already the case where groundwater is pumped 
from low and falling water-tables. If the water (or the power to pump it) is subsidised, the 
taxpayer bears the steadily rising production cost. If it is not, the farmer will not find such a 
thirsty crop worthwhile. Much less irrigation water will need to be used per unit of output, i.e. 
land will need to be converted to higher-value crops (and to techniques such as micro-drip that 
inexpensively, but labour-intensively, concentrate water on the root zone). The fact that much 
riceland is divided into paddies, and seasonally waterlogged, creates short-run conversion costs 
that disguise, but do not change, this. Further, on irrigated land without heavy (open or hidden) 
water subsidies – and hence without water overuse that will prove less and less tolerable – it will 
hardly ever be profitable by 2015 to grow maize, sorghum or millet, and seldom wheat. Urgent 
consideration is thus indicated for policy options to accelerate and accommodate a move, in 
irrigated  areas,  away  from  food  staples  towards  crops,  methods  and  systems  yielding 
much  more  value-added  per  litre.  Alongside  this  might  be  research  and  infrastructures 
(including for water control) for much higher productivity of these crops in suitable, though 
largely rainfed, areas of the West-Central poverty crescent. Such policy choices will have 
better chances of sustaining growth and benefiting the poor if they contain, not only the familiar 
(and correct) ‘water liberalisation’ – desubsidisation, water markets, user groups – but, at least 
as important, irrigation  maintenance,  research,  and carefully  located  new investment (IFAD 
2001).  
 
(v)  Agricultural  research  and  the  poor:  Research  choices  should  be  screened  for  their 
concentration of gains on the poorest. This involves steering research towards crops and areas 
with a large share of labour (and small farmers) in income. Also crucial is avoiding publicly 
financed research or subsidy for labour-displacing innovations (weedicides, combines, etc).  
 
China is a world leader in agricultural sciences, including application of biotechnology. Cotton 
is  concentrated  in  a  poor  province,  Xinjiang.  There  especially,  transgenic  (Bt)  cotton  has 
benefited poor farmers, raising net income and security and reducing illness and death from 
pesticide toxicity (Huang et al. 2003). China is actively considering release of Bt rice. This 
policy option would similarly raise the income and health of the poor, as well as increasing food 
security directly. However, for maximum benefit to the poorest areas, transgenics research 
may need to switch towards ‘crop per drop’ and drought tolerance in poor areas’ main 
crops, conditions and times (e.g. in maize during anther formation).    34 
 
Such shifts in national research area concentration need to be informed by awareness of the big 
impending regional crop-mix shifts in China (see above). For cost-effective results, the research 
effort has also to be led, from the start, by committed scientists, working with economists and 
other policy analysts to a science-based strategy.
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(f) The rural non-farm sector, liberalisation, poor people and regions: policy options 
 
In the 1980s, the poor in the booming parts of rural China experienced rising demand for the 
RNFS due to ‘growth linkages’, fuelled initially by demand from rising local farm incomes and 
later  by  demand  for  inputs  to  manufacturing  for  national,  and  recently  world,  markets. 
Successful RNFS growth in poor areas, with slow farm growth, is harder to achieve. RNFS 
growth caused not by growth linkages from agriculture, but by ‘distress diversification’ from 
underemployed farm families, pushes down local wage-rates and seldom does much to reduce 
poverty. Many poor and remote areas face too high transport and other transaction-costs to 
compete as RNFS suppliers to wider urban or international markets. 
 
Yet in larger villages with denser populations, quite often found in the West, public action can 
stimulate RNFS growth. First, where farm growth is feasible, secondary demand for RNFS 
products can stimulate local supply; higher density of rural roads and rural banking institutions 
is known to favour RNFS development (Binswanger and Khandker 1995). Second, easing of 
market  access  (intermediation,  bulking  up)  may  permit  RNFS  supply  to  factories;  location 
incentives and suitable transport policies can make private-sector intermediation more likely.  
 
While long-term subsidy is undesirable, there is a case for some initial public action to support 
and facilitate potentially sustainable RNFS development in suitable remote areas. Phasing out 
hukou  – desirable for poverty reduction for many reasons (sec. 4 (c) (ii)) – may attract sudden 
surges of rural migrants to some areas, exacerbating tensions and the burdens of the urban 
government. RNFS employment opportunities for those unable, or unwilling, to work on the 
farm may well spread over time, and hence make more manageable, the influx to the cities. 
 
(g) Rural financial markets 
 
Poor rural households, seeking to develop farms or other small businesses, often cannot borrow 
at all, or only at very high interest to a near-monopolistic local lender. There is experience 
around the developing world of three public-sector approaches that do not solve the problem. 
First,  laws  to  regulate  or  reduce  the  rate  of  interest  charged  by  lenders  are  almost  always 
counter-productive.
79 Second, publicly subsidised lenders, mandated to lend to poor or small 
farms at below-market interest rates, usually develop huge deficits, yet benefit mainly middle-
to-large borrowers (and officials with whom they share the economic rents). Third, heavy public 
supervision of lending agencies is a costly way for remote supervisors to pressurise borrowers 
and lenders alike to use funds differently from what they judge wisest.  
 
Policy options for China might address reasons why poor rural households find it so hard to 
borrow, viz.  (a) monopoly lenders: the key players of China’s rural financial market, RCCs 
(rural credit co-operatives), have little incentive to serve rural borrowers, and largely channel 
rural  savings  to  urban  uses;    (b)  asymm-etric  information  –  lenders  do  not  know  which 
borrowers are reliable, leading to adverse selection and moral hazard; (c) enforcement costs of 
collecting  interest  from  many  poor  borrowers;  (d)  covariate  risk  –  people  in  a  rural  area, 
especially if remote and unirrigated, face bad outcomes (drought, flood, pests, epidemic) at the 
                                                 
78In Sri Lanka, rice research switched from its successes in the Dry Zone to the much more difficult conditions of the 
Wet Zone in the 1980s, with great success.  
79Such laws cannot be fully enforced, yet their partial and selective enforcement reduces the supply of credit, creates 
corruption, and inhibits the development of rural financial institutions.   35 
same time, and therefore are unable to repay, or to help one another, just when lenders are least 
able to extend periods of loan; (e) lack of collateral among would-be poor borrowers. The 
unsuccessful approaches above – in addition to distorting markets – fail to address these issues. 
 
Total liberalisation (subject to careful regulation of major lenders’ solvency and liquidity) of 
rural financial services would increase the supply of rural credit and thus reduce its market price 
(as laws against high interest cannot do). However, such a policy, on its own, does not tackle the 
problems  (a)  to  (d)  above.  Nor,  therefore,  does  it  steer  lending  to  poor  farmers  or  RNFS 
entrepreneurs in remote areas.  
 
The first problem (a) cannot be addressed if reforming the rural financial system leaves RCCs 
(even  if  reformed)  a  de  facto  monopoly  in  rural  financial  markets.  Absent  other  financial 
agencies, RCCs are less a farmers’ cooperative than a government agency. To approach free 
competition  in  rural  financial  markets,  other  agencies,  including  private  lenders,  should  be 
allowed to operate, in a prudential and gradual way.  
 
The main successful international approaches to problems (b)-(d) were pioneered by NGOs and 
semi-NGOs such as Grameen and BRAC (Bangladesh) and counterparts in India, Indonesia and 
Egypt.  These handled (b) and (c) – collateral, enforcement, and asymmetric information – via 
small, peer-monitored rural groups with, typically, five to fifteen small-enterprise households as 
members. They accept joint liability for loans from higher-level institutions, and provide ‘social 
collateral’ by monitoring and mutual support of each other’s enterprise and repayment. Problem 
(d), covariate risk, is addressed at national level because the village lender is a branch, and the 
national bank supports lenders in many areas.  
 
This does not address village-level covariate risk. How can farmers repay when crops fail? A 
promising approach is public comprehensive crop insurance (Mishra 1996). In several Indian 
States it avoids moral hazard by paying out not for low farm output, but when local rainfall is 
outside measured limits. Actuarially fair insurance premia proved consistent with meeting hard 
budget constraints  
 
In the context of (and complementing) financial liberalisation, policy options of competitive 
peer-moni-tored group lending and crop insurance deserve review at county, provincial and 
national levels. Though it is hard to predict prospects of translating international experiences to 
China,
80 pilots  are  worth  trying.  Also,  China  could  allow  farmers  to  self-organize  to  help 
themselves via farmers’ professional associations (FPAs), which help overcome asymmetric-
information  problems  typical  in  rural  finance.  This  suggests  a  draft  corresponding  law  to 
facilitate the formation and operation of FPAs (Zhang and Huang 2004).  
    
(h) The ‘twin burden’: social policy against rural and regional poverty and inequality 
 
While growing rapidly and liberalising, China has to accommodate the health and educational 
needs both of lagging regions and rural people, and of the standard-bearers of rapid, modern 
economic growth. This ‘twin burden’ has a demographic dimension too. Remote and rural areas 
still contain large proportions of young dependants with basic health and educational needs. 
Advanced urban areas contain rising proportions of old people, and many young adults with 
rapidly rising needs for higher education.  
 
There are ‘twin health burdens’ in the fast-growing countries of the developing world. Diseases 
of poverty (dysentery, TB, malaria) are still rampant among poor people and in the worst-off 
                                                 
80‘Clones of Grameen’ have a mixed record; much is known about conditions for success. They seldom reach the 
poorest 10-20 percent of village enterprises (Hulme and Mosley 1996). Increasing the supply of credit can produce 
sustainable poverty reduction only in areas with technical progress and/or new market prospects. Also, loans are not 
the only financial services with effective, but frustrated, demand from poor enterprises and households; Grameen and 
several ‘clones’ succeed partly by making regular micro-savings a condition for receipt of loans.     36 
regions, alongside ‘diseases of affluence’ (heart disease and diabetes) among the best off  – and 
among the growing proportion of over-sixties. Also, growth shifts the causes of ‘diseases of 
affluence’ (smoking and obesity) steadily down the income scale. In India it is still the richest 
who are fattest and smoke most, in the USA it is the poorest, and Brazil the highest incidence of 
obesity has shifted over the decades from the lowest to the fifth decile. A further link between 
the twin burdens is that it is malnourished (i.e. poor!) under-fives have been shown in a fifty-
year Gambia panel to be at greatest risk of fatal infections in their fifties; they also probably 
have highest risk of diabetes and heart disease in their sixties.
81 What are the policy options to 
bring the health and nutrition status of the deprived up to better parts and people of China – 
while  perhaps  helping  to  interrupt  the  growth  of  so-called  diseases  of  affluence  and  their 
underlying causes? Political pressures will mount to divert health expenditures towards more 
affluent and older people, and towards higher levels of service. The linkage between the ‘twin 
burdens’, however, suggests that it may prove inefficient, as well as inequitable, to concentrate 
too heavily on such needs at the cost of remote rural areas.  
 
A similar policy choice faces education. The booming areas of China need many more top-flight 
university graduates and post-graduates; yet in China, as in India, remote poor regions and 
ethnic groups have low quantity and quality of secondary and even primary education. This 
reduces the pool of talent on which higher education can draw. Also educational inequality is 
associated, across nations, with slower growth (Birdsall et al. 1995). While advanced education 
needs to expand, it would be inefficient (and divisive) if this were at the expense of more basic 
needs in poorer regions. 
 
The better off, urban, and politically more powerful will press for more (and costly) health care 
for diabetes and heart disease, and for more and costlier higher education. These will be needed, 
but meanwhile the poor and remote still suffer inadequate basic education, and mass diseases of 
poverty – which may cause later diseases of affluence (and sedentarisation), especially if they 
urbanise – but have less political clout to get preventive and curative measures. In India and 
elsewhere, expanding university education on a weak primary and secondary base has damaged 
universities  themselves.  China,  in  exploring  other  options,  may  need  to  mobilise  political 
pressures and economic resources for better schools in remote areas. 
                                                 
81 The latter is the Barker hypothesis. For references and evidence on this paragraph, see Lipton 2001.   37 













































Source: Huang and Rozelle (2005). 
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Note: Range is for average per capita net income of households, e.g. households with 1,500–
2,000 RMB/person use 18 per cent of household labour off the farm.  
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Figure 9a. Gini indices of income inequality 
 
 






Figure 9b. Urban-Rural Income Ratio, 1980-2003 
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Table 1. The annual real growth rates (%) of China’s economy, 1970-2003 (2001 prices) 
Reform period    Pre-reform 
1970–78  1979–84  1985–95  1996–00 2001  2002  2003 
Gross domestic 
products  4.9  8.5  9.7  8.2  7.5  8.0  9.3 
   Agriculture  2.7  7.1  4.0  3.4  2.8  2.9  2.5 
   Industry  6.8  8.2  12.8  9.6  8.4  9.8  12.7 
   Service  n.a.  11.6  9.7  8.2  8.4  7.5  7.3 
               
Foreign trade  20.5  14.3  15.2  9.8  7.5  21.8  34.5 
               
   Import  21.7  12.7  13.4  9.5  8.1  21.3  37 
   Export  19.4  15.9  17.2  10.0  6.8  22.4  32 
               
Grain production  2.8  4.7  1.7  0.03  –2.16  0.38  –5.9 
Oil crops  2.1  14.9  4.4  5.6  –3.04  1.13  –2.98 
Fruits  6.6  7.2  12.7  8.6  6.95  4.42  108 
Red meats  4.4  9.1  8.8  6.5  3.88  4.02  5.3 
Fishery  5.0  7.9  13.7  10.2  2.40  4.18  3.07 
               
Population  1.80  1.40  1.37  0.90  0.70  0.65  0.6 
               
Per capita GDP  3.1  7.1  8.3  7.1  6.7  7.2  8.7 
Note: Figure for GDP in 1970-78 is the growth rate of national income in real term. Growth 
rates  are  computed  using  regression  method.  Growth  rates  of  individual  and  groups  of 
commodities are based on production data; sectoral growth rates refer to value added in real 
terms.  
Source: NSBC, Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues; MOA, Agricultural Yearbook of 
China, various issues. 
 
Table 2. GDP and employment shares by sector, 1970-2003 (%) 
  1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2002  2003 
Share in GDP                 
    Agriculture  40  30  28  27  20  16  15  14 
    Industry  46  49  43  42  49  50  51  52 
    Services  13  21  29  31  31  33  34  34 
Share in employment                 
    Agriculture  81  69  62  60  52  50  50  49 
    Industry  10  18  21  21  23  22  21  22 
    Services  9  13  17  19  25  28  29  29 
Trade to GDP ratio  n.a  13  23  30  40  44  49  51 
Share in Export                 
   Primary Products  n.a.  50  51  26  14  10  9   
      Foods  n.a.  17  14  11  7  5  4   
Share in Import                 
   Primary Products  n.a.  35  13  19  18  21  17   
      Foods  n.a.  15  4  6  5  2  2   
Share of rural population  83  81  76  74  71  64  61  59 
Source: NBSC, Yearbook of Statistics, various issues   45 
Table 3. Structure of China’s food and feed trade (US$ million), 1980 to 2003 
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002 
Exports:                 
   Live animals and meat  745 752 1,221 1,822 1,628 1,976  1,008
   Dairy products  71 57 55 61 188 192  194
   Fish  380 283 1,370 2,875 3,705 4,231  4,690
   Grains, oils and oilseeds  481 1,306 1,237 1,608 2,667 1,835  2,422
   Horticulture  1,074 1,260 2,293 3,922 4,367 4,931  6,402
   Sugar  221 79 317 321 173 156  227
Sum of above foods  2,972 3,737 6,493 10,609 12,728 13,340  14,943
Imports:     
   Live animals and meat  6 24 68 115 696 659  706
   Dairy products  5 31 81 60 218 219  274
   Fish  13 44 102 609 1,212 1,319  1,558
   Grains, oils and oilseeds  2,472 1,065 2,535 6,760 4,163 5,343  5,825
   Horticulture  104 92 113 259 677 866  838
   Sugar  316 274 390 935 177 376  238
Sum of above foods  2,916 1,530 3,289 8,736 7,143 8,782  9,439
Net exports:     
   Live animals and meat  739 728 1,153 1,707 932 1,317  302
   Dairy products  66 26 –26 1 –30 –27  –80
   Fish  367 239 1,268 2,266 2,493 2,912  3,132
   Grains, oils and oilseeds  –1,991 241 –1,298 –5,152 –1,496 –3,490  –3,403
   Horticulture  970 1,168 2,180 3,663 3,690 4,065  5,564
   Sugar  –95 –195 –73 –614 –4 –220  –11
Sum of above foods  56 2,207 3,204 1,873 5,585 4,558  5,504
 
Source: Data for 1980-95: Mathews (2001), based on UN COMTRADE statistics. Data after 
1995:  various  publications  of  China’s  National  Statistical  Bureau  and  China’s  Custom 
Authority.    46 
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Poverty incidence (%) with pov. line: 
Official    Revised 
1978  260  32.9       
1979  239  30.2       
1980  218  27.6                  40.65             75.70 
1981  194  24.4                  28.62             64.67 
1982  140  17.5                  17.33             47.78 
1983  123  15.3                  13.34             38.38  
1984  89  11.0                    9.87             30.93 
1985  96  11.9                    8.82             22.67 
1986  97  11.9                    9.85             23.50  
1987  91  11.2                   8.29              21.91 
1988  86  10.4                   7.99              23.15 
1989  102  11.6                  11.88             29.17 
1990  85  9.4  280  31.3              10.55             29.18 
1991  94  11.0  287  31.7              11.66             29.72 
1992  80  8.8  274  30.1                9.83             28.18  
1993  75  8.3  266  29.1              11.29             27.40  
1994  70  7.7  237  25.9              10.41             23.32 
1995  65  7.1  200  21.8                7.83             20.43 
1996  58  6.3  138  15.0                4.20             13.82 
1997  50  5.4  124  13.5                4.83             13.33 
1998  42  4.6  106  11.5               3.24              11.58 
1999  34  3.9                   3.43              11.40  
2000  32  3.4                   5.12              12.96 
2001  29  3.2                   4.75              12.49  
2002  28  3.1  78.6  8.7   
2003  29  3.1  74.9  8.0   
Sources:  Cols.  1-4,  1978-1988:  World  Bank  (1992);  1989-2001:  NBSC  (2003);  2002, 
computed from NBSC (2003); 2003, MOA (2004). Cols. 5-6: Ravallion and Chen (2004). For 
col. 6, ‘with (us), NBS has been developing [new] poverty lines that . . . better reflect current 
conditions. Region-specific food bundles are used… separate food bundles for urban and rural 
areas, valued at median unit values by province, . . . based on the actual consumption bundles 
of those between the poorest 15th percentile and the 25th percentile nationally (and) scaled to 
reach  2,100  calories/person/day,  with  75%…from  foodgrains.  Allowance  for  non-food 
consumption is based on nonfood spending of households (near) the point at which total 
spending equals the food poverty line in each province (and separately for urban and rural 
areas)’ (Ravallion and Chen, 2004:6).   47 
Table 5. Rural household characteristics by income groups for each region in 
1999 
    Income groups from lowest (1) to highest (11) 
  Average1  
(3.5%)





















Family size  4.53  5.46  5.34  5.19  4.98  4.80  4.55  4.49  4.24  4.06  3.93  3.58 
Labour  2.84  2.95  3.10  3.06  2.99  2.93  2.87  2.87  2.75  2.68  2.63  2.50 
Fam. size/labour  1.60  1.85  1.72  1.70  1.67  1.64  1.59  1.56  1.54  1.51  1.49  1.43 
Off-farm time %  11.1  3.7  5.2  6.8  8.3  8.2  11.1  10.9  10.8  12.1  14.9  17.1 
Labour education (%)                        
   Full/semi-illiterate  17.5  29.6  27.6  25.4  22.5  19.7  18.3  16.4  13.8  12.1  10.4  10.0 
   Primary school  38.1  38.9  39.7  37.3  38.3  41.0  38.1  40.6  38.5  36.4  35.8  34.6 
   Middle school  36.5  25.9  27.6  31.4  34.2  34.4  37.3  37.5  40.0  41.7  43.3  44.3 
   High school/above  7.9  5.6  5.2  5.9  5.0  4.9  6.3  5.5  7.7  9.8  10.4  11.1 
HH arable land (mu)  8.5  11.8  10.3  9.8  9.1  8.8  8.3  8.9  8.3  8.2  8.4  10.1 
 
Central China 
Family size  3.99  4.51  4.56  4.46  4.39  4.30  4.27  4.14  4.08  3.97  3.81  3.50 
Labour  2.63  2.84  2.83  2.77  2.76  2.71  2.77  2.69  2.69  2.70  2.66  2.52 
Fam.size/labour   1.52  1.59  1.61  1.61  1.59  1.59  1.54  1.54  1.52  1.47  1.43  1.39 
Off-farm time %  12.3  4.8  6.5  9.7  11.1  11.1  12.3  12.3  15.2  14.7  17.1  15.3 
Labour education (%)                         
   Full/semi-illiterate  6.2  7.9  8.1  6.5  7.9  7.9  6.2  6.2  6.1  5.9  4.3  5.2 
   Primary school  33.8  34.9  35.9  35.5  33.3  31.7  33.8  32.3  31.8  32.4  31.4  29.2 
   Middle school  49.2  49.2  46.8  48.4  47.6  49.2  49.2  50.0  50.0  51.5  51.4  50.7 
   High school/above  10.8  7.9  9.3  9.7  11.1  11.1  10.8  11.5  12.1  10.3  12.9  14.9 
HH arable land (mu)  11.2  18.0  12.9  10.9  11.2  10.4  10.4  10.3  10.4  11.4  12.5  13.7 
 
Eastern China 
Family size  3.95  4.43  4.61  4.51  4.44  4.36  4.33  4.14  4.07  3.92  3.70  3.51 
Labour  2.65  2.88  2.91  2.84  2.84  2.83  2.85  2.78  2.77  2.74  2.66  2.60 
Fam. size/labour  1.49  1.54  1.58  1.59  1.56  1.54  1.52  1.49  1.47  1.43  1.39  1.35 
Off-farm time %  22.5  9.2  11.1  12.7  14.1  18.5  19.7  20.9  25.0  28.6  31.9  37.8 
Labour education (%)                         
   Full/semi-illiterate  6.0  7.7  7.9  6.3  6.3  6.2  5.3  4.9  4.5  4.3  4.2  4.1 
   Primary school  31.3  33.8  31.7  33.3  32.0  30.8  31.8  31.3  31.3  29.6  29.5  28.4 
   Middle school  49.3  49.2  49.2  49.2  50.0  50.8  50.0  49.6  49.3  49.3  48.3  48.6 
   High school/above  13.4  9.2  11.1  11.1  11.7  12.3  12.9  14.2  14.9  16.8  18.1  18.9 
HH arable land (mu)  5.6  9.2  6.9  6.7  6.2  6.2  6.2  6.0  5.5  5.2  4.9  4.1 
 
Note: Off-farm employment share: full-time equivalent working time in off-farm (30 days per 
months and 12 months per year) as percentage of total available family labour time (30 days 
per month and 12 months per year).  
Source: Huang, Rozelle and Zhang (2004).   48 
Table 6. Rural household income and expenditure (yuan)  
by income groups and regions, 1999 



























Per capita net income  1,502  356  592  783  960  1,130  1,302  1,497  1,723  2,026  2,494  3,961 
Wage income  332  55  98  146  177  213  250  302  364  487  630  941 
   Wage income %  22  15  17  19  18  19  19  20  21  24  25  24 
Agri. income %  62  76  68  66  67  66  66  65  63  60  57  50 
Per capita living exp.  1,197  685  706  774  887  967  1,067  1,182  1,329  1,488  1,734  2,383 
   Food expenditure  706  455  488  519  582  621  666  717  785  851  930  1,125 
   Food expenditure %  59  66  69  67  66  64  62  61  59  57  54  47 
Central China 
Per capita net income  2,003  459  840  1,118  1,366  1,574  1,785  2,007  2,260  2,584  3,098  4,726 
Wage income  488  127  184  237  288  363  419  493  572  649  794  1,090 
   Wage income %  24  28  22  21  21  23  23  25  25  25  26  23 
Agri. income %  65  69  76  74  72  70  67  65  63  62  60  55 
Per capita living exp.  1,437  920  957  1,050  1,146  1,249  1,286  1,406  1,497  1,658  1,947  2,506 
   Food expenditure  788  552  574  631  672  717  747  797  830  895  982  1,143 
   Food expenditure %  55  60  60  60  59  57  58  57  55  54  50  46 
Eastern China 
Per capita net income  2,929  598  1,074  1,437  1,780  2,100  2,425  2,800  3,236  3,826  4,780  8,040 
Wage income  1,106  154  253  383  513  640  788  964  1,206  1,535  2,028  3,476 
   Wage income %  38  26  24  27  29  30  32  34  37  40  42  43 
Agri. income %  42  72  65  60  55  53  49  47  43  38  35  26 
Per capita living exp.  1,991  1,024  1,041  1,194  1,365  1,487  1,680  1,865  2,129  2,465  3,059  4,367 
   Food expenditure  963  588  618  689  757  807  877  936  1,026  1,148  1,322  1,668 
   Food expenditure %  48  57  59  58  55  54  52  50  48  47  43  38 
 
Note: The  difference between  per capita  income  and  living  expenditure  is  mainly  due to 
farmers’ saving and the payments for tax, fee, income transfer and others not included in 
living expenditure. 
Source: Huang, Rozelle and Zhang (2004)   49 
Table 7: Assets-per-person distribution by income groups for 1995 and 2002 (%) 
  Urban      Rural      National  Groups 
Income/person deciles( low (1), high (10)) (10)  1995  2002    1995  2002    1995  2002 
1  0.7  0.2    3.1  2    2  0.7 
2  2.2  2.6    4.7  3.7    3.8  2.1 
3  3.2  4    5.8  4.9    5  3 
4  4.3  5.3    6.7  6    6.1  3.8 
5  5.6  6.5    7.7  7.1    7.2  4.8 
6  7.3  8    8.8  8.4    8.4  6.2 
7  9.3  9.9    10.2  9.9    9.8  8.3 
8  12.1  12.6    12  12    11.8  11.8 
9  16.9  17.2    14.9  15.6    15.2  17.9 
10  38.5  33.9    26.2  30.5    30.8  41.4 
Source: Li, Wei and Ding (2005) 
 
Table 8: Assets per person: national, urban and rural 
  1995 





Annual growth   
1995–2002 (%) 
National       
Net Value  12,102  25,897  114  11.5 
Land (exc. houseplots)  3,828  2,421  –36.8  –6.3 
Financial Assets  1,908  5,643  195.8  16.8 
Housing (inc. houseplots)  4,289  14,989  249.5  19.6 
Productive Fixed Assets  525  1,037  97.5  10.2 
Durable Cons. Goods  1,441  1,784  23.8  3.1 
Non-housing Debt  –65  –219  236.9  18.9 
Others  175  242  38.3  4.7 
Urban         
Net Value  13,698  46,134  236.8  18.9 
Financial Assets  3,841  11,958  211.3  17.6 
Housing (inc. houseplots)  5,985  29,703  396.3  25.7 
Productive Fixed Assets  165  815  393.9  25.6 
Durable Cons. Goods  3,156  3,338  5.8  0.8 
Non-housing Debt  –61  301  393.4  25.6 
Others  612  620  1.3  0.2 
Rural         
Net Value  11,427  12,938  13.2  1.8 
Land (exc. houseplots)  5,350  3,974  –25.7  –4.2 
Financial Assets  1,131  1,593  40.8  5 
Housing (inc. houseplots)  3,599  5,565  54.6  6.4 
Productive Fixed Assets  664  1,182  78  8.6 
Durable Cons. Goods  750  793  5.7  0.8 
Non-housing Debt  –67  –169  152.2  14.1 
Note: Net assets: derived by deducting liabilities from assets.  
Source: Li, Wei and Ding (2005).    50 
Table 9. Economic development by regions (2002) 
  GDP per cap.DP  % GDP in ag.P  Rural income per capita GDP 
China  9,255  14  2,476 
North  10,758  10  2,703 
Northeast 10,813  13  2,509 
East  12,266  12  3,203 
Central  9,018  15  2,641 
Southwest 5,144  21  1,894 
Northwest 6,180  18  1,744 
Sources: NBSC (2003); Fan (2003) 
 
Table 10: The relationship between overall economic growth and inequality 
Periods  Inequality  Growth rate in household 
income per capita (%/year) 
1981–85  Falling  8.9 
1986–94  Rising  3.1 
1995–98  Falling  5.4 
1999–2001  Rising  4.5 
Source: Ravallion and Chen (2004) 
 
Table 11: Provinces with lowest mean rural income, 2001 
Province  Rural mean income  % poor  Rural private income Gini 
  Yuan (1980 
prices)  Growth, %/year  Official pov. 
line *  Level  Growth, %/year 
  2001  1980–2001  2001  2001  1983/8–2001 
Yunnan  188.5  1.09  25.54  0.3234  2.55 
Qinghai  235.7  1.08  19.34  0.3976  1.46 
Sha’anxi  235.9  2.43  14.59  0.3044  2.41 
Guizhou  247.8  1.05  14.57  0.2683  1.05 
Xinjiang  284.3  0.97  19.04  0.3961  1.39 
Hubei  293.6  2.64  1.84  0.2833  1.87 
Henan  304.6  3.09  14.46  0.2585  1.04 
Gansu  326.2  3.66  28.63  0.3578  1.75 
Ningxia  358.1  2.85  15.20  0.3645  2.06 
China  642.6  3.36  12.49  n.a.  1.72 
Note: *Corrected as noted under Table 4 above. Of the 28 provinces with data (not Tibet and 
Hainan), none had above 10 percent of persons below the official poverty line in 2001.  
Source: Ravallion and Chen 2004, tables 13–14.   51 
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